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ABSTRACT	  	  In	   this	   research,	   the	   turnaround	   model	   named	   as	   “3R-­‐ACAP”	   was	   proposed,	  which	   is	   applicable	   to	   the	   Japanese	   shipbuilding	   industry	   that	   has	   currently	  entered	   the	   largest	   recession	   period	   as	   ever.	   Shipbuilding	   is	   a	   cyclic	   industry	  having	  huge	  fluctuations	  and	  therefore,	  its	  “Ability	  to	  change”	  in	  response	  to	  the	  environment	  is	  essential.	  As	  Charles	  Darwin	  mentioned,	  “It	  is	  not	  the	  strongest	  of	  the	   species	   that	   survives,	   nor	   the	   most	   intelligent,	   but	   the	   one	   who	   are	   most	  responsive	  to	  change”.	  	  The	   3R-­‐ACAP	   model	   was	   developed	   by	   integrating	   the	   concept	   of	   ACAP	  (Absorptive	   Capacity)	   into	   the	   strategic	   3R	  model	   in	   order	   to	   complement	   the	  missing	   part	   of	   the	   3R	   model.	   The	   missing	   function	   is	   in	   fact	   the	   process	   of	  assimilating	  and	  utilizing	  information	  to	  create	  strategies.	  Although	  the	  “Ability	  to	   change”	   is	   recognized	   as	   an	   essential	   factor	   to	   survive,	   the	   process	   of	   how	  firms	   assimilate	   and	   utilize	   valuable	   information	   in	   order	   to	   change	   was	   not	  included	   in	   any	   of	   the	   turnaround	  models.	   And	   therefore	   the	   concept	   of	   ACAP	  was	   integrated	   into	   the	   3R	  model.	   The	   3R	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   stands	   for	   three	  categories	  of	  strategies	  including	  “Retrenchment”	  for	  reductions	  in	  scope	  or	  size	  of	   organizations,	   “Reorganization”	   for	   any	   changes	   in	   management	   or	  organization”,	  and	  “Realignment”	  for	  strategic	  changes	  for	  growth.	  	  The	  keyword	  derived	  from	  the	  analysis	  of	  Shipbuilding	  Industry	  by	  the	  3R-­‐ACAP	  model	   is	   “Energy	   related	  moves”	   suggesting	   Japan	   the	   two	  major	   strategies	   to	  turnaround	   from	   the	   current	   crisis.	   That	   is	   at	   first,	   differentiation	   by	   further	  development	  of	  “Energy	  saving	  ships”	  for	  its	  recovery	  and	  second,	  diversification	  into	  other	  “Energy	  related”	  for	  its	  renewal.	  	  	  The	  3R-­‐ACAP	  model	  also	  provided	  an	  important	  lesson	  from	  the	  Europeans	  that	  achieved	   turnaround	   from	   the	   oil	   crisis.	   At	   the	   time,	   Europeans	   utilized	   its	  advanced	   technologies	   not	   only	   for	   “Product”	   oriented	   moves	   but	   also	   for	  “Market”	  oriented	  moves	  while	  Japan	  utilized	  its	  advanced	  technologies	  only	  for	  “Product”	   oriented	   moves.	   As	   a	   result,	   Europeans	   succeeded	   to	   create	  competitive	  advantage	  in	  particular	  segments.	  What	  is	  recommended	  for	  current	  Japan	   is	   to	   create	   competitive	   advantages	   by	   combination	   of	   the	   two	   different	  types	  of	  moves	   that	  are	  not	  easily	   taken	  away	  by	  competitors.	  Shipyards	  could	  move	  into	  various	  other	  non-­‐marine	  products	  by	  different	  combination	  of	  its	  key	  technologies.	  	  
Keywords:	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Chapter	  1	  	  	  Introduction	  	  The	  world’s	  shipbuilding	  industry	  currently	  entered	  its	  largest	  recession	  period	  after	   it	  experienced	   the	   largest	  peak	  as	  ever.	  What	   triggered	   the	  recession	  was	  the	  world’s	   economic	   crisis	   lead	   by	   the	   failure	   of	   Lehman	  Brothers	   in	   2008.	   It	  caused	  sudden	  decline	  in	  various	  industries	  including	  the	  shipbuilding	  industry.	  Due	  to	  huge	  overcapacity	   in	  the	  world	  shipping	  fleet,	  new	  orders	   for	  shipyards	  suddenly	   dropped	   and	   a	   severe	   price	   competition	   among	   shipbuilders	   have	  started.	  	  However,	   this	  was	  not	   in	   fact	   the	   first	  nor	   the	  second	  crisis	   in	   its	  history	  since	  shipbuilding	   is	   truly	   a	   cyclic	   industry	   having	   huge	   fluctuation	   of	   growth	   and	  decline	  as	  its	  nature.	  According	  to	  Dr.	  Martin	  Stopford	  the	  President	  of	  Clarkson	  Research,	  there	  were	  12	  peaks	  since	  1902	  including	  4	  major	  peaks	  that	  appeared	  in	   35	   years	   cycle.	   The	   four	  major	   peaks	   are	   the	   fourth	   peak	   in	   the	   1910s,	   the	  eighth	  peak	  in	  the	  1940s,	  the	  tenth	  peak	  in	  the	  1970s,	  and	  the	  twelfth	  peak	  in	  the	  2010s.	  The	  fourth	  and	  the	  eight	  peaks	  were	  both	   lead	  by	  wartime	  construction	  and	  ended	  with	  the	  end	  of	   the	  wars.	  The	  tenth	  peak	  was	   lead	  by	  growth	  of	   the	  world’s	   economy	   by	   abundant	   energy	   sources	   and	   ended	  with	   the	   oil	   crisis	   in	  1973	  and	  1979.	  And	  currently,	   the	  twelfth	  peak,	  which	  was	  the	   largest	  as	  ever,	  ended	   with	   the	   economic	   crisis	   in	   2008.	   Rapid	   growth,	   which	   was	   lead	   by	  economic	  growth	  of	  developing	  countries	  have	  ended	  and	   the	  recession	  period	  have	  now	  started.	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Table	  1.1	  -­‐	  History	  of	  the	  world	  shipbuilding	  and	  its	  cycle	  
	  
	  Source:	  SMM	  Advance	  Press	  Conference	  23th	  May	  2012	  “World	  Shipbuilding”	  Dr	  Martin	  Stopford,	  President,	  Clarkson	  Research	  
	  
Problem	  identification	  Major	   problem	   of	   the	   current	   world’s	   shipbuilding	   industry	   is	   again	   its	   huge	  overcapacity	   caused	   by	   the	   gap	   between	   supply	   and	   demand.	   While	   demand	  from	   ship	   owners	   dropped	   sharply,	   building	   capacity	   of	   shipbuilders	   has	   not	  changed	  that	  much.	  Although	  many	  shipbuilders	  are	  surviving	  by	  consuming	  its	  order	  backlogs,	  which	  they	  served	  before	  the	  crisis,	  a	  long	  recession	  period	  and	  severe	   price	   competition	   have	   already	   started.	   Aim	   of	   this	   study	   is	   to	   find	   an	  applicable	   turnaround	  model	   for	   Japanese	   shipbuilding	   industry	   that	   provides	  shipyard	  managers	  a	  framework	  to	  manage	  the	  process	  of	  turnaround.	  	  	  Although	   Japan	   stepped	   down	   to	   the	   world’s	   No.3	   in	   terms	   of	   Gross	   tonnage	  output,	   it	   is	   still	   in	   matured	   stage	   in	   terms	   of	   technological	   development.	  However,	   working	   in	   a	   matured	   industry	   often	   makes	   manager’s	   mindset	  conservative	   because	   of	   successful	   past	   experiences.	   In	   spite	   of	   environmental	  changes	  occurred,	  managers	  tend	  to	  stick	  onto	  previous	  business	  models,	  which	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gradually	  widen	   the	   gap	  between	   firm’s	   activity	   and	  demand	   from	   the	  market.	  Changing	   routine	   is	   always	   a	   challenge	   for	   managers	   especially	   in	   a	   matured	  industry.	  The	  goal	  of	  this	  study	  is	  to	  provide	  a	  framework	  for	  managers	  to	  utilize	  its	   internal	   and	   external	   sources	   efficiently	   to	   assimilate	   valuable	   information	  from	  its	  changing	  environment	  and	  to	  utilize	  it	  to	  create	  turnaround	  strategies.	  	  
Research	  design	  and	  methodology	  In	   chapter	   two,	   background	  of	   the	   shipbuilding	   industry	   is	   studied	   in	   order	   to	  acquire	  basic	  understanding	  of	  the	  industry.	  At	  first,	  the	  history	  of	  development	  by	  leading	  countries	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  shipbuilding	  are	  studied.	  And	  second,	  the	  major	  countries	  and	  players	  representing	  each	  country	  are	  studied.	  	  	  In	   chapter	   three,	   literature	   surveys	   to	   create	   theoretical	   foundations	   of	   this	  research	   are	   conducted.	   It	   includes	   surveys	   of	   turnaround	   definitions,	  turnaround	   processes,	   and	   major	   turnaround	   models.	   Survey	   of	   major	  Absorptive	   Capacity	   (ACAP)	  models	   is	   also	   done,	  which	   is	   the	  most	   significant	  part	  of	  this	  research.	  Through	  the	  study	  of	  shipbuilding	  industry	  in	  chapter	  two,	  it	   is	   found	   that	   its	   “Ability	   to	   respond	   to	   change”	   is	   an	   essential	   ability	   for	  shipbuilders’	   survival.	   However,	   although	   importance	   of	   this	   ability	   was	  recognized	  by	  researchers,	  process	  of	  how	  firms	  assimilate	  and	  utilize	  valuable	  information	   to	   create	   strategies	   to	   respond	  with	   its	   environmental	   change	   are	  not	   included	   in	   any	   turnaround	   model.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   Zahra	   and	   George	  (2002)	   define	   ACAP	   as	   “Firm’s	   ability	   to	   recognize	   value	   of	   information,	  assimilate	  it	  and	  apply	  it	  to	  commercial	  ends”.	  And	  therefore,	  it	  is	  hypothesized	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  ACAP	  could	  complement	  the	  missing	  part	  of	  the	  turnaround	  models.	  	  	  In	   chapter	   four,	   the	   original	   turnaround	   model	   named	   3R-­‐ACAP	   model	   is	  developed	  by	  integrating	  “Zahra	  and	  George’s	  ACAP	  model”	  (2002)	  into	  “George	  A.	  Boyne’s	  3R	  turnaround	  model”	  (2006).	   	  Feasibility	  of	  the	  model	  is	  confirmed	  by	   examination	   of	   the	   three	   practical	   cases	   including	   turnaround	   of	   the	   U.S.	  copper	  industry,	  the	  British	  steel	  industry,	  and	  the	  Brazilian	  aircraft	  industry.	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Chapter	   five	   includes	  examination	  of	   the	  shipbuilding	   industry	   in	   the	  1970s	  oil	  crisis	   to	   confirm	   feasibility	   of	   the	   3R-­‐ACAP	   model	   in	   shipbuilding	   industry.	  Examination	   is	  done	   in	  both	   Japanese	  and	  European	  shipbuilding	   industry	  and	  the	  result	  of	  examination	  will	  become	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  entire	  research	  since	  the	   purpose	   of	   this	   research	   is	   to	   create	   an	   applicable	   turnaround	   model	   for	  Japanese	  shipbuilding	  industry.	  	  In	   chapter	   six,	   analysis	   of	   the	   three	   Japanese	   shipbuilders	   in	   current	   crisis	   is	  done	   by	   using	   the	   3R-­‐ACAP	   model.	   Recommendations	   are	   also	   given	   by	  considering	  the	  result	  of	  studies	  in	  chapter	  five.	  And	  chapter	  seven	  includes	  the	  summary,	  conclusion	  for	  the	  whole	  research,	  and	  limitation	  of	  this	  study.	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2-­‐1-­‐1	  Development	  of	  The	  World’s	  Shipbuilding	  and	  Leading	  Countries	  
	  As	   it	   is	  widely	  argued	  by	  researchers,	  shipbuilding	   industry	   is	  a	  cyclic	   industry	  having	  periodical	  upward	  and	  downward	   cycle.	  There	  had	  been	   in	   fact	   several	  fluctuations	   related	   to	   wars,	   economical	   events,	   crisis	   etc.	   in	   its	   history.	   And	  interestingly,	   leaders	   of	   the	   world	   shipbuilding	   shifted	   among	   countries	  following	   these	   cycles.	   Developing	   countries	   enter	   the	   market	   with	   low-­‐cost	  strategy	  when	  market	  grows,	  and	  then	  take	  over	  previous	  leader’s	  market	  share	  when	  market	  declines	  and	  overcapacity	  occurs.	  The	  world	  shipbuilding’s	  history	  is	  a	  cyclic	  fluctuation	  followed	  by	  change	  of	  leaders.	  	  	  What	  is	  noticeable	  here	  is	  that	  although	  leaders	  shifted	  among	  countries,	  former	  leaders	  are	  still	  surviving	  by	  changing	  its	  strategies.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  the	  history	  of	  world’s	   shipbuilding	   will	   be	   studied	   by	   major	   development	   stages	   lead	   by	  different	  leaders.	  	  
Figure	  2.1	  -­‐	  Worlds	  shipbuilding	  by	  leading	  countries	  
	  Source:	  The	  Author’s	  original	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The	   book	   selected	   here	   to	   acquire	   fundamental	   knowledge	   of	   shipbuilding	   is	  “Changing	   Global	   Industry	   Leadership:	   The	   case	   of	   Shipbuilding”	   written	   by	  Dong	  Sung	  Cho	  and	  Michael	  E.	  Porter.	  The	  reason	  why	  this	  book	  was	  selected	  is	  that	  they	  describe	  facts	  in	  a	  neutral	  position,	  not	  viewing	  from	  a	  specific	  country,	  which	  is	  important	  to	  study	  the	  whole	  shipbuilding	  industry	  from	  a	  broad	  view.	  
	  
Development	  of	  the	  world	  shipbuilding	  and	  shift	  of	  leaders	  
	  
From	  the	  United	  States	  to	  the	  Great	  Britain	  Until	  the	  mid	  nineteenth	  century,	  the	  United	  States	  was	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  world’s	  shipbuilding	  dominating	  90%	  of	  the	  commercial	  ship’s	  market.	  At	  the	  time,	  ships	  were	  made	  of	  wood	  and	  U.S.	  had	  strong	  advantage	  due	   to	  abundant	  and	  cheap	  timber	  provided	  within	  the	  country.	  	  However,	   in	   the	   early	   nineteenth	   century,	   two	   destructive	   technologies	   had	  emerged.	  One	  is	  the	  steam	  engine	  and	  the	  other	  is	  use	  of	  iron	  and	  steel	  as	  a	  new	  material	  for	  ship’s	  hull.	  The	  steam	  engine	  was	  first	  applied	  to	  an	  American	  ship	  named	  “Clermont”	  in	  1807	  and	  became	  widely	  used	  by	  1830s.	  The	  first	  iron	  ship	  named	   “Great	   Britain”	   was	   built	   in	   1843.	   Application	   of	   these	   technologies	  started	  from	  the	  England’s	  Navy	  ships	  in	  1860s	  and	  gradually	  spread	  among	  the	  commercial	  shipbuilding	  and	  finally	  in	  1914,	  96.5	  percent	  of	  the	  world’s	  fleet	  had	  been	  replaced	  with	  steam	  ships	  and	  90	  percent	  became	  steel	  ships.	  	  Demand	   for	   wartime	   construction	   contributed	   greatly	   to	   increase	   the	   worlds’	  vessel	  tonnage	  and	  thus	  shipbuilders	  increased	  its	  building	  capacity	  to	  deal	  with	  growing	  demand.	  However,	  when	  the	  World	  War	  One	  ended,	  they	  suddenly	  went	  into	   recession	   caused	   by	   the	   1920s	   great	   depression	   and	   suffered	   with	  overcapacity	   of	   shipbuilders.	   The	   output	   between	   1930	   and	   1933	   dropped	   by	  83%	  and	  many	  shipyards	  exit	  the	  market	  or	  halt	  construction.	  However,	  even	  in	  a	  crisis,	  England	  was	  able	  to	  maintain	  higher	  share	  than	  the	  U.S.	  since	  they	  had	  advanced	  background	  of	  industrialization	  and	  efficient	  facilities	  to	  produce	  low-­‐cost	  and	  high-­‐quality	  vessels.	  As	  a	  result,	  England	  became	  the	  new	  leader	  of	  the	  world’s	  shipbuilding	  by	  taking	  up	  the	  U.S.	  position.	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From	  the	  Great	  Britain	  to	  Western	  Europe	  During	   the	   1950s,	   global	   economy	  was	   recovering	   from	   damage	   of	   the	  World	  War	   II	   and	  most	  Western	  European	   countries	   except	   the	  United	  Kingdom	  was	  making	   effort	   to	   expand	   its	   fleet.	   The	   UK	   was	   still	   competitive	   by	   production	  efficiency	   and	   reliance	   of	   machineries	   at	   the	   beginning	   but	   gradually	   lost	   its	  share	  against	  Western	  Europe	  countries	  because	  of	  its	  high	  wage.	  	  During	  this	  period,	  Western	  European	  countries	  had	  experienced	  rapid	  growth,	  took	  over	   the	  UK’s	  position	  soon	  and	  captured	  70	   to	  80	  percent	  of	   the	  world’s	  share.	   They	   had	   advantage	   in	   producing	   low-­‐cost	   ships	   based	   on	   its	   low-­‐wage	  and	   also	   they	   had	   highly	   advanced	   onboard	   machineries	   supplied	   within	   the	  region.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   Japan	   started	   to	   grow	   rapidly	   because	   Japanese	  government	   implemented	   the	   “Keikaku	   Zosen”,	   a	   government	   lead	   program	   to	  re-­‐build	  its	  merchant	  fleet,	  which	  was	  almost	  completely	  destroyed	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  World	  War	  Two.	  	  
From	  Western	  Europe	  to	  Japan	  Until	  the	  late	  1950s,	  Japan	  rapidly	  expanded	  its	  share	  in	  the	  market.	  From	  1955	  through	  1956,	  Japan’s	  share	  grown	  from	  15.6	  percent	  to	  26.2	  percent	  and	  grown	  further.	  	  According	  to	  Dong	  Sung	  Cho	  and	  Michael	  Porter	  (1986,	  Changing	  Global	  Industry	  Leadership:	   The	   Case	   of	   Shipbuilding,	   Competition	   in	   Global	   Industries),	   there	  had	   been	   mainly	   three	   factors	   contributed	   to	   the	   growth	   of	   Japan.	   First,	   the	  government	   lead	   “Keikaku	   Zozen”	   provided	   Japan’s	   shipbuilders	   not	   only	  with	  stable	   job	   but	   also	   with	   advantage	   to	   lower	   its	   marginal	   costs.	   Second,	  nationalization	  of	  the	  Suez	  Canal	  in	  1956	  brought	  a	  boom	  for	  new	  orders.	  Japan	  succeeded	   to	   take	   huge	   amount	   of	   orders	   from	   customers	   looking	   for	   early	  delivery.	   Western	   European	   shipyards	   were	   in	   fact	   not	   able	   to	   take	   this	  opportunity	   since	   its	   order	   backlogs	   was	   already	   occupied	   for	   ships	   ordered	  during	  the	  Korean	  War	  boom	  through	  1950	  and	  1951.	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Third,	   series	  of	   financial	   subsidies	  by	   the	  government,	   such	  as	   the	   “Temporary	  measures	  pertaining	   to	   the	   reduction	  of	   cost	   in	   shipbuilding”,	   and	   the	   “System	  link	   ship	   exports	   with	   imports	   of	   crude	   sugar”	   had	   been	   executed.	   Japanese	  shipbuilders	   utilized	   subsidies	   to	   modernize	   its	   production	   facilities	   and	   to	  develop	   innovating	   construction	   processes.	   “Block	   construction”	   method	   was	  one	   of	   the	  most	   innovative	   construction	  method	   contributed	   to	   lower	   its	   cost.	  Investment	   in	  production	   facilities	   later	  contributed	  to	  build	   larger	  ship,	  which	  was	   the	   new	   trend	   to	   transport	   cargos	   efficiently	   and	  during	   the	   1960s,	   Japan	  built	   the	  world’s	   largest	   tankers:	   “Nisho	  Maru”	   in	  1962,	   “Tokyo	  Maru”	   in	  1965,	  and	  “Idemitsu	  Maru”	  in	  1966.	  	  Until	   the	   early	   1970s,	   low-­‐price	   and	   abundant	   energy	   accelerated	   the	  industrialization	  of	  the	  world	  economy	  and	  Japan	  rapidly	  expanded	  its	  share	  by	  low-­‐cost	  startegies.	  In	  1965,	  Japan’s	  market	  share	  rose	  to	  41.4	  percent	  and	  later	  in	   1970,	   surpassed	   Europe	   and	   became	   the	   world’s	   No.1.	   And	   thus,	   Western	  European	   countries	   started	   to	   change	   its	   products	   towards	   high-­‐value	   added	  ships	  to	  avoid	  direct	  competition	  with	  Japan.	  	  
Energy	  crisis	  and	  the	  global	  recession	  The	   energy	   crisis	   started	   in	   1973	   had	   a	   serious	   impact	   on	   triggering	   the	  shrinkage	  of	  world’s	  shipbuilding.	  The	  output	  peaked	  in	  1975	  because	  of	  order	  backlogs	  and	  dropped	  by	  60	  percent	  through	  1979.	  Overcapacity	  accelerated	  by	  the	  entry	  of	  South	  Korea	  made	  the	  situation	  worse	  for	  incumbents.	  	  	  The	   two	  key	   issues	   to	   survive	  were	   to	   “Improve	  productivity”	  and	   to	   “Produce	  eco	   ships”.	   The	   first	   issue	   was	   to	   lower	   production	   cost	   by	   improving	  productivity.	   Nowadays,	   shipbuilding	   is	   still	   considered	   as	   a	   labor-­‐intensive	  industry	  but	  during	  this	  period,	  it	  was	  more	  labor	  intensive	  and	  many	  processes	  had	   been	   automated.	   The	   second	   issue	   was	   to	   produce	   “Eco	   ship”	   to	   reduce	  operation	  cost.	  By	  producing	  energy	  efficient	  engines	  etc.,	   shipyards	  succeeded	  to	  reduce	  fuel	  consumption	  by	  60	  percent	  at	  the	  time.	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According	  to	  Dong	  Sung	  Cho	  and	  Michael	  Porter	  (1986),	  the	  global	  recession	  lead	  by	  the	  energy	  crisis	  had	  three	  major	  impacts	  to	  the	  world	  shipbuilding.	  The	  first	  impact	  was	  decline	  of	  Western	  European	  shipbuilders.	  Its	  high	  labor	  cost	  and	  old	  production	  facilities	  were	  no	  more	  competitive.	  The	  second	  impact	  was	  growth	  of	   the	   Japanese	   shipbuilders.	   Its	   labor	   cost	   was	   already	   high	   but	   it	   was	  compensated	  by	  production	  efficiency.	  	  	  In	   addition,	   they	   had	   advanced	   technologies	   to	   produce	   “Eco	   ships	   ”	   with	  advanced	  fuel	  consumption,	  which	  could	  be	  sold	  at	  higher	  price.	  And	  thus,	  Japan	  maintained	   its	   position	   as	   the	  world’s	   No.1.	   The	   third	   impact	  was	   entrance	   of	  South	  Korea	   as	   a	   low-­‐cost	   leader.	   Although	   they	   initially	   did	   not	   have	  modern	  technology,	   Western	   European	   Shipyards	   contributed	   to	   provide	   them	   with	  technologies	   and	   as	   a	   result,	   they	   rapidly	   grown	   and	   soon	   became	   the	   major	  competitor	  of	  Japan.	  	  
From	  Japan	  to	  South	  Korea	  In	  the	  early	  1970s,	  South	  Korea	  entered	  the	  market	  as	  a	  low-­‐cost	  leader	  and	  then	  gradually	   took	  over	  other	  player’s	  share	   just	  as	   Japan	  did	   in	   the	  1950s.	  Korean	  government	   considered	   shipbuilding	   industry	   as	   an	   important	   industry	   to	   its	  economic	  growth	  and	  support	   the	   industry	  with	  many	  programs.	  They	   focused	  on	   the	   export	   market	   from	   its	   beginning	   to	   accumulate	   foreign	   currency	   and	  experienced	   a	   rapid	   growth	   in	   1980s.	   In	   the	  middle	   of	   1990s,	   its	  world	   share	  increased	  jumped	  up	  to	  25	  percent	  and	  in	  2002	  it	  surpassed	  Japan	  and	  became	  the	   world’s	   No.1.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   growth	   of	   Chinese	   shipyards	   started	  following	  its	  economic	  growth.	  	  
Economic	  crisis	  and	  the	  global	  recession	  The	   economic	   crisis	   in	   2008	   is	   seriously	   affecting	   the	   world	   shipbuilding	  currently.	   Due	   to	   sudden	   decline	   in	  world’s	   economy,	   decline	   in	   sea	   transport	  occurred,	  and	  due	  to	  overcapacity	  in	  world’s	  fleet	  and	  decline	  in	  sea	  freight,	  ship	  owners	  stopped	  placing	  new	  orders	  and/or	  canceled	  its	  orders.	  What	  made	  the	  overcapacity	  serous	  is	  mainly	  China’s	  massive	  investment	  to	  double	  its	  building	  capacity	  before	  the	  crisis.	  	  
	   10	  
From	  South	  Korea	  to	  China	  China	   experienced	   a	   rapid	   growth	   increasing	   its	   market	   share	   and	   surpassed	  Japan	  in	  2002,	  surpassed	  South	  Korea	  in	  2009	  and	  now	  has	  become	  the	  world’s	  No.1	  in	  terms	  of	  gross	  tonnage	  output.	  	  
2-­‐1-­‐2	  Nature	  of	  The	  Shipbuilding	  Industry	  
	  Four	   major	   characters	   to	   define	   the	   nature	   of	   shipbuilding	   industry	   were	  identified	  through	  the	  study	  of	  shipbuilding’s	  history.	  At	   first,	   it	  was	  found	  that	  change	   is	   essential	   to	   secure	   its	   position	   in	   global	   competitions.	   And	   second,	  there	   are	   cyclical	   fluctuations	   and	   shift	   of	   leaders	   occurs	   following	   the	   cycles.	  And	  third,	  supply	  by	  shipyards	  are	  inelastic	  and	  therefore,	  market	  price	  is	  highly	  volatile.	   And	   fourth,	   shipbuilding	   is	   an	   industry,	   which	   is	   heavily	   affected	   by	  change	  of	  currency	  rate	  often	  caused	  by	  political	  issues.	  	  An	  important	  lesson	  here	  is	  that	  “Ability	  to	  adopt	  itself	  to	  changing	  environment”	  is	   essential	   for	   shipbuilders	   to	   survive.	  As	  Charles	  Darwin	  mentioned,	   “It’s	  not	  
the	  strongest	  of	  the	  species	  that	  survive,	  nor	  the	  most	  intelligent,	  but	  the	  one	  
most	  responsive	  to	  change”.	  Ability	   to	  respond	  to	  change	   is	  essential	  not	  only	  for	  animals	  but	  also	  for	  shipbuilders.	  
	  
Change	  is	  essential	  to	  secure	  its	  position	  in	  global	  competitions	  Although	  it	  has	  improved	  in	  many	  aspects,	  shipbuilding	  is	  still	  a	  labor	  intensive	  industry	   compared	   with	   other	   industries	   such	   as	   automobiles	   and	   consumer	  electric	   products.	   Incumbents	   are	   often	   challenged	   by	   developing	   countries	  having	   low	  cost	  advantage	  and	  therefore	  strategic	  changes	  are	  always	  required	  for	  incumbents	  to	  secure	  its	  position	  in	  global	  competitions.	  	  As	   shown	   in	  Table	  2.1,	  numbers	  of	  previous	   leaders	  are	   surviving	  by	   changing	  strategies	  mainly	  by	  moving	  toward	  more	  sophisticated	  ships.	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Japan	   South	  Korea	   China	  
1945-1955 Low cost leader  
   
1955-1975 Specialization  
Low cost leader   
1975-1985 Specialization  
Differentiation Low cost leader  
1985-1995 










Low cost leader 
2005-2010 






Low cost leader 
Current Specialization Differentiation Ambidexterity  
Low cost leader 
 
Specialization (or segmentation) (niche market) strategy is used in specialized markets in 
which firms gain more advantage through innovation rather than efficiency 
Differentiation strategy aims for a broad market in which customers are willing to pay a 
premium for the brand or technology 
Low cost strategy aims for standardized mass products with large economies of scale 
Ambidexterity strategy combines both differentiation and low cost strategy to have efficient 
products for current customers and innovate to serve future customers  
 Source:	  Modified	  chart	  by	  the	  Author	  based	  on	  Sung	  Cho	  Don	  and	  Michael	  Porter’s	  chart	  in	  “Changing	  global	  industry	  leadership:	  the	  case	  of	  shipbuilding”	  	  
Cyclical	  fluctuation	  and	  shift	  of	  leaders	  As	   already	   mentioned	   by	   numbers	   of	   researchers,	   shipbuilding	   is	   a	   cyclic	  industry	  having	  major	  fluctuation	  within	  approximately	  35	  years.	  If	  we	  look	  back	  into	  the	  history,	  there	  had	  been	  four	  major	  peaks.	  The	  first	  and	  the	  second	  peak	  was	   lead	  by	   the	  wartime	  constructions,	   the	   third	  peak	  was	   lead	  by	   the	  world’s	  industrialization	  by	  abundant	  energy	  resources,	  and	  the	  fourth	  peak	  was	  lead	  by	  the	  growth	  of	  world	  economy	  especially	  in	  developing	  countries.	  	  	  After	  the	  four	  peaks,	  leaders	  of	  the	  world’s	  shipbuilding	  industry	  shifted	  among	  countries	   in	   the	   recession	   period.	   This	   is	   why	   market	   entry	   by	   developing	  countries	   is	  especially	  strong	  when	  market	   is	   in	  growth	  stage.	   	  And	   later	  when	  recession	   period	   starts,	   developing	   countries	   increases	   its	   share	   by	   taking	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previous	  leader’s	  share.	  In	  a	  recession	  period,	  developing	  countries	  with	  lo	  wage	  but	   low	   technology	   has	   advantage	   in	   taking	   low-­‐end	   users	   from	   the	   market,	  which	  consists	  the	  large	  portion	  of	  the	  market.	  
	  
Inelastic	  supply	  and	  highly	  volatile	  price	  Shipbuilding	   is	   a	   long-­‐term	   project	   requiring	   years	   of	   time,	   huge	   production	  facilities,	  material	  to	  build,	  manpower,	  and	  financial	  resources	  and	  usually	  takes	  three	  to	  five	  years	  from	  order	  to	  delivery	  of	  ships.	  	  Ship	  owners	  therefore	  rush	  to	  take	  the	  earliest	  slots	  when	  market	  booms.	  However,	  shipyards	  are	  not	  able	   to	  increase	   its	   capacity	   immediately	   to	   respond	   to	   steep	   increase	   and	   therefore,	  price	  of	  ships	  jumps	  up	  even	  to	  double.	  	  	  What	   happens	   in	   an	   opposite	   case	   is	   that	   shipyards	   are	   not	   able	   to	   reduce	   its	  capacity	   immediately	   to	   sudden	   decrease	   and	   therefore,	   price	   of	   ships	   drops	  even	  to	  half.	  Due	  to	  inelastic	  supply	  of	  ships,	  price	  of	  ships	  are	  therefore	  highly	  volatile	  and	  widely	  fluctuated	  by	  the	  balance	  of	  demand	  and	  supply.	  
	  
Political	  issues	  affecting	  currency	  rate	  Shipbuilding	   is	   an	   export-­‐oriented	   business	   and	   therefore	   change	   in	   currency	  rate	   by	   political	   issues	   and	   economical	   events	   has	   a	   significant	   impact	   to	  determine	   the	   net	   value	   of	   ships.	   Although	   currency	   rate	   is	   not	   a	  manageable	  factor	  by	  shipyards,	  shipyards	  sometimes	  utilize	  forward-­‐exchange	  contract	  with	  banks	  according	  to	  its	  forecast	  to	  minimize	  the	  risk	  of	  loss.	  	  
2-­‐2	  Major	  Players	  in	  The	  World	  
	  Leader	  of	  the	  world	  shipbuilding	  industry	  have	  changed	  several	  times	  since	  the	  middle	   of	   the	   nineteenth	   century	  when	   the	   United	   States	   was	   the	   leader.	   The	  major	  players	  in	  the	  world	  as	  of	  today	  are	  Japan,	  South	  Korea	  and	  China,	  which	  dominate	  the	  world	  shipbuilding	  market	  of	  18.3	  percent,	  32.9	  percent,	  and	  40.9	  percent.	  In	  this	  section,	  the	  three	  countries	  will	  be	  introduced	  in	  order	  to	  acquire	  basic	   knowledge	   of	   the	   major	   players.	   In	   addition	   to	   the	   three	   countries,	  Europeans,	   which	   was	   previously	   the	   leader	   of	   world	   shipbuilding	   are	   to	   be	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introduced.	   Europeans	   are	   in	   fact	   having	   relatively	   small	   share	   in	   terms	   of	  tonnage	   output.	   However,	   they	   are	   still	   dominating	   particular	   segments	   in	   the	  market	  such	  as	  cruise	  ships	  and	  dredger	  boats.	  	  	  
Table	  2.2	  -­‐	  World	  completions	  
	  
	  Source:	  Shipbuilding	  Statistics	  March	  2013,	  The	  Shipbuilders’	  Association	  of	  Japan	  	  
Europe	  Europeans	   are	   currently	   not	   listed	   in	   the	   top	   shipbuilding	   companies	   in	   the	  world.	   However,	   they	   are	   creating	   its	   competitive	   advantage	   in	   particular	  segments	  such	  as	  cruise	  ships	  by	  utilizing	   its	  highly	  advanced	  technologies	  and	  design	  skills.	  As	  for	  cruise	  ships,	  Europeans	  have	  been	  dominating	  this	  segment	  for	   nearly	   40	   years	   and	   currently	   has	   98	   percent	   share	   in	   this	   area.	   As	   for	  individual	  firms,	  Fincantieri	  (Italy)	  is	  the	  world’s	  No.1	  having	  36.2	  percent	  of	  the	  share.	  Meyer	  Werft	  (Germany)	  is	  the	  second	  with	  32.5	  percent	  and	  STX	  Europe	  (Finland/France)	   is	   the	   third	   with	   25.7	   percent.	   In	   addition	   to	   cruise	   ships,	  Europeans	  are	  active	  in	  offshore	  products	  and	  special	  purpose	  vessels.	   In	  these	  areas,	  Norway,	  Spain	  and	  Netherlands	  have	  39	  percent	  of	  the	  world’s	  share	  as	  of	  2009.	  	  
	  	  	  	  Fincantieri	  Cantieri	  Navali	  SpA	  Fincantieri	  is	  an	  Italian	  shipyard	  founded	  in	  1959	  and	  is	  currently	  the	  largest	  shipyard	  in	  Europe.	  Its	  major	  product	  is	  cruise	  ship	  but	  they	  also	  have	  various	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designs	   for	   commercial	   ships,	   offshore	   products	   and	   naval	   vessels	   including	  submarines.	  They	  are	  also	  active	  in	  ship	  repairs	  and	  conversion	  businesses.	  It	  currently	  has	  eight	  shipyards	  and	  has	  approximately	  9,000	  employees.	  (Cited	  from	  Fincantieri’s	  web	  site)	  	  
	  	  	  	  Meyer	  Werft	  GmbH	  Meyer	   Werft	   is	   a	   family	   owned	   German	   shipyard	   founded	   in	   1795	   in	  Papenburg	  at	  the	  time	  when	  ships	  were	  all	  made	  of	  wood.	   It	  started	  building	  iron	  ships	  with	  steam	  engines	  in	  1872.	  Papenburg	  was	  a	  home	  of	  20	  shipyards	  but	  Meyer	  Werft	  was	  the	  only	  shipyard	  survived	  until	  the	  21st	  century.	  During	  the	  two	  world	  wars,	  it	  concentrated	  on	  building	  shipping	  boats,	  pilot	  boats	  and	  lightships	   together	   with	   coastal	   passenger	   boats.	   	   And	   later	   in	   the	   1960s,	   it	  started	  building	   gas	   tankers	   and	  Ro-­‐Ro	   ferry	   ships.	  Meyer	  Werft	   is	   currently	  specialized	   in	   car	   and	   passenger	   ferries,	   Ro-­‐Ro	   and	   passenger	   ships,	   gas	  tankers,	  livestock	  carriers	  and	  above	  all,	  luxurious	  cruise	  ships,	  which	  they	  are	  ranked	  in	  the	  worlds	  No.2.	  (Cited	  from	  Meyer	  Werft’s	  web	  site)	  	  
	  	  	  	  STX	  Europe	  AS	  STX	  Europe,	  which	  formerly	  named	  Aker	  Yards	  ASA	  is	  a	  subsidiary	  of	  the	  South	  Korean	   STX	   Corporation.	   It	   is	   an	   international	   shipbuilding	   group	   having	  specialized	   in	  production	  of	  cruise	  ships,	   ferries,	  offshore	  products	  and	  other	  special	  purpose	  ships.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  nine	  shipyards	  belonging	  to	  STX	  OSV	  Holdings	   Limited,	   STX	   Europe	   has	   six	   shipyards	   including	   six	   shipyards	   in	  Finland,	  France,	  and	  Norway.	  STX	  Europe’s	  principal	  shareholder	  is	  the	  South	  Korean	  STX	  Corporation,	  which	  has	  about	  54,000	  employees.	  STX	  Corporation	  is	   specialized	   in	   various	   businesses	   including	   shipping,	   trade,	   shipbuilding,	  machineries,	  plants,	  and	  energy.	  (Cited	  from	  STX	  Europe’s	  web	  site)	  	  
Japan	  Japan’	   shipbuilding	   industry	   experienced	   a	   rapid	   growth	   especially	   after	   the	  World	  War	   II	   and	   had	   dominated	   the	  market	   for	   decades	   as	   the	  world’s	   No.1.	  Although	  Japan	  is	  gradually	  losing	  its	  share	  against	  South	  Korea	  and	  China	  since	  its	  emergence,	  Japan	  still	  rank	  in	  the	  world’s	  No.3	  as	  of	  2013.	  In	  terms	  of	  Gross	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tonnage	  output	  as	  of	  2012,	  Mitsubishi	  Heavy	  Industry	  ranks	  in	  the	  world’s	  fifth,	  Tsuneishi	   Zozsen	   is	   in	   the	   sixth,	   Oshima	   shipbuilding	   is	   in	   the	   seventh,	   and	  Imabari	  Zosen	  is	  in	  the	  ninth.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  Mitsubishi	  Heavy	  Industries,	  Ltd.	  Mitsubishi	   was	   founded	   in	   1884	   in	   Nagasaki.	   Mitsubishi	   currently	   has	   four	  shipyards	  including	  shipyards	  in	  Nagasaki,	  Kobe,	  Shimonoseki,	  and	  Yokohama.	  It	   has	   been	   producing	   various	   types	   of	   ships	   including	   cruise	   ships,	   LNG	  carriers,	   oil	   tankers,	   car	   carriers,	   battle	   ships,	   and	   submarines.	   It	   also	   has	  various	   group	   companies	   specialized	   in	   bank	   business,	   automobiles,	   atomic	  products,	  chemical	  products,	  power	  systems,	  and	  optical	  industry.	  (Cited	  from	  Mitsubishi’s	  web	  site)	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  Tsuneishi	  Shipbuilding	  Co.,	  Ltd.	  Tsuneishi	   is	  a	   family	  owned	  company	  founded	  in	  1917	  and	  are	  specialized	  in	  bulk	  carriers	   segment.	  The	  shipbuilding	  division	  of	  Tsuneishi	  Group	  has	   four	  shipyards	   including	   Tsuneishi	   shipyard,	   Tadotsu	   shipyard,	   Cebu	   shipyard	   in	  Philippine,	   and	   Zhoushan	   shipyard	   in	   China.	   It	   has	   various	   designs	   of	   ships	  including	   bulk	   carriers,	   tankers,	   car	   carriers	   and	   wood	   chip	   carriers.	   (Cited	  from	  Tsuneishi’s	  web	  site)	  	  
	  	  	  	  Oshima	  Shipbuilidng	  Co.,	  Ltd.	  Oshima	  is	  a	  shipbuilding	  company	  founded	  in	  1973	  by	  joint	  venture	  between	  Sumitomo	   Corporation,	   Sumitomo	   Heavy	   Industries,	   and	   the	   Daizo	  Corporation.	  It	  is	  specialized	  in	  building	  bulk	  carriers	  and	  has	  various	  designs	  in	   the	   segment.	   They	   are	   specialized	   in	   middle	   size	   bulk	   carriers	   such	   as	  handy-­‐max	  and	  handy	  bulk	  carriers	  and	  have	  approximately	  1,100	  employees	  as	  of	  2013.	  (Cited	  from	  Oshima’s	  web	  site)	  
	  	  	  	  
Imabari	  Shipbuilding	  Co.,	  Ltd.	  Imabari	   is	  a	   family	  owned	  company	   founded	   in	  1942	  and	  are	  specialized	  not	  only	   in	   new	   shipbuilding	   but	   also	   in	   repair	   of	   various	   type	   of	   ships.	   The	  Imabari	   group	   has	   eight	   shipyards	   concentrated	   in	   the	   Seto	   Inland	   Sea	   area	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and	   are	   producing	   approximately	   90	   ships	   per	   year	   and	   has	   delivered	  more	  than	  2,000	  ships	  until	  today.	  (Cited	  from	  Imabari’s	  web	  site)	  	  
Korea	  In	  Korea,	  there	  are	  several	  group	  companies	  specialized	  not	  only	  in	  shipbuilding	  but	   also	   in	   other	   marine	   or	   non-­‐marine	   products.	   The	   four	   largest	   Korean	  shipbuilders	   are	   Hyundai	   Heavy	   Industries,	   Daewoo	   Shipbuilding,	   Samsung	  Heavy	   Industry,	   and	   STX	   Shipbuilding.	   In	   terms	   of	   output	   by	   Gross	   tonnage,	  Hyundai,	  Daewoo,	  and	  Samsung	  dominates	  the	  worlds	  top	  3	  as	  of	  2012.	  	  
	  	  	  	  Hyundai	  Heavy	  Industries	  (HHI)	  HHI	  Shipbuilding	  division	   is	   the	  world’s	  number	  one	  shipbuilder	  having	  15%	  share	   of	   the	  market.	  HHI	   is	   producing	   various	   types	   of	   ships	   including	   three	  major	   types	   that	   are	   tankers,	   bulk	   carriers	   and	   container	   vessels.	   Since	   its	  foundation	   in	   1972	   it	   has	   expanded	   building	   facilities	   and	   currently	   has	   ten	  large	  drydocks	   including	  nine	  drydocks	   equipped	  with	   “Goliath	  Cranes”	  with	  huge	  lifting	  capacity.	  It	  has	  delivered	  more	  than	  1,800	  ships	  as	  of	  2013	  since	  its	  foundation	  in	  1972.	  (Cited	  from	  HHI’s	  web	  site)	  	  
	  	  	  	  Daewoo	  Shipbuilding	  &	  Marine	  Engineering	  (DSME)	  DSME	   is	   the	  world’s	   second	   largest	   shipbuilder	  with	  around	  6	  percent	  of	   the	  world’s	   share.	  Since	   its	   foundation	   in	  1973	  at	  Okpo	  Bay,	  Georje	   Island,	   it	  has	  expanded	   building	   facility	   rapidly	   until	   1981.	   DSME	   is	   currently	   building	  various	  types	  of	  ships	   including	  LNG	  carriers,	  LPG	  carriers,	  container	  vessels,	  crude	   oil	   carriers,	   ore	   bulk	   carriers,	   and	   car	   carriers.	   DSME	   is	   especially	  specialized	   in	   LNG	   carriers	   market,	   which	   accounts	   over	   one-­‐third	   of	   the	  world’s	  fleet.	  (Cited	  from	  DSME’s	  web	  site)	  	  	  	  	  	  Samsung	  Heavy	  Industries	  (SHI)	  SHI	  is	  the	  world’s	  third	  largest	  shipbuilder	  established	  in	  1974.	  SHI	  delivered	  more	  than	  800	  ships	  as	  of	  June	  2012	  and	  has	  various	  types	  of	  ships	  including	  tankers,	   container	   vessels,	   bulk	   carriers,	   and	   LNG	   carriers.	   It	   also	   has	   a	  separate	  division	  of	  various	  offshore	  products	  including	  FPSO	  /	  FSO	  /	  FDS	  and	  
	   17	  
drill	   ships.	   SHI	   currently	   has	   world’s	   No.1	   share	   in	   drill	   ships,	   ultra	   large	  container	  ships,	  LNG	  carriers	  and	  FPSOs.	  (Cited	  from	  SHI’s	  web	  site)	  	  
	  	  	  	  STX	  Shipbuilding	  (STX)	  STX	   is	   the	   fourth	   largest	   shipbuilder	   in	   the	   world	   founded	   in	   1967	   as	  “Dongyang	  shipbuilding”	  at	  its	  beginning.	  It	  has	  various	  ship	  designs	  including	  LNG	  carriers,	  LPG	  carriers,	  container	  ships,	  tankers,	  ore	  bulk	  carriers,	  and	  car	  carriers.	   STX	   is	   currently	   reinforcing	   its	   offshore	   businesses	   including	   FPSO,	  drill	  ships,	  semi	  submersible	  rigs	  and	  LNG	  floaters.	  STX	  shipbuilding	  is	  a	  part	  of	  the	  large	  STX	  group.	  (Cited	  from	  STX’s	  web	  site)	  	  
China	  Shipyards	  in	  China	  could	  be	  divided	  into	  two	  groups	  that	  are	  China	  Shipbuilding	  Industry	   Corporation	   (CSIC)	   and	   China	   State	   Shipbuilding	   Corporation	   (CSSC).	  Both	  are	  state	  owned	  shipbuilding	  enterprises	  dominating	   the	  Chinese	  market.	  By	   individual	   shipyards,	  Dalian	  Shipbuilding	   Industry,	   Jiangnan	  Changxing,	   and	  Jiangsu	  Rongsheng	  ranks	  within	  the	  world	  top	  ten	  by	  tonnage	  outputs.	  	  
	  	  	  	  China	  Shipbuilding	  Industry	  Corporation	  (CSIC)	  CSIC	   is	   one	   of	   the	   China’s	   largest	   shipbuilding	   and	   ship	   repairing	   groups	  established	  in	  1999.	  CSIC	  consists	  of	  several	  shipyards	  and	  institutes	  of	  former	  China	  State	  Shipbuilding	  Corporation.	  The	  group	  currently	  has	  seven	  shipyards	  having	  building	  capacity	  of	  five	  million	  DWT	  per	  year.	  It	  has	  capability	  not	  only	  to	  build	  products	  for	  commercial	  use	  but	  also	  for	  military	  use	  and	  are	  building	  naval	  ships.	  Although	  its	  main	  product	  is	  tanker	  it	  also	  has	  capability	  to	  build	  container	  ships,	  bulk	  carriers,	  and	  Ro-­‐Ro	  vessels.	  CSIC	  is	  currently	  reinforcing	  its	   offshore	   engineering	   sector	   including	   FPSO	   and	   drilling	   platforms.	   (Cited	  from	  CSIC’s	  web	  site)	  	  
	  	  	  	  China	  State	  Shipbuilding	  Corporation	  (CSSC)	  CSSC	   is	   a	   state	   owned	   company	   established	   in	   1999.	   Its	   main	   business	   is	  shipbuilding	   including	   ships	   for	  Chinese	  Navy.	   In	  2005	   it	   ranked	   the	  world’s	  number	  five	  and	  in	  2010	  it	  ranked	  at	  number	  three.	  Although	  it’s	  main	  product	  
	   18	  
is	  bulk	   carrier	   and	   tanker,	   it	   also	  has	   capability	   to	  build	  LNG	  carriers,	  Ro-­‐Ro	  ships,	  container	  ships.	  CSSC	  is	  reinforcing	  offshore	  businesses	  as	  well	  as	  CSIC	  (Cited	  from	  CSSC’s	  web	  site)	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Chapter	  3	  	  	  Literature	  Review	  	  In	   order	   to	   create	   theoretical	   foundation	   to	   develop	   an	   original	   turnaround	  model,	   literature	   reviews	   on	   previous	   researches	   are	   conducted.	   Literature	  review	  was	  initially	  planned	  in	  three	  areas	  including	  “Definition	  of	  turnaround”,	  “Process	  of	  turnaround”,	  and	  “Major	  turnaround	  models”.	  	  	  However,	   during	   the	   process	   of	   research,	   it	   was	   found	   that	   one	   of	   the	   most	  important	   functions	   required	   for	   turnaround	   of	   the	   shipbuilding	   industry	  was	  missing.	  The	  process	  of	  how	   firm’s	  ability	  works	   to	  recognize	  external	  changes	  and	   how	   it	   affects	   creation	   of	   turnaround	   strategies	   was	   not	   shown	   in	   any	  turnaround	  model.	  And	  therefore,	   in	  order	  to	  complement	  the	  missing	  function	  of	  the	  turnaround	  models,	  Absorptive	  Capacity	  (ACAP)	  was	  added	  for	  the	  fourth	  research	  area.	  	  
3-­‐1	  Turnaround	  Process	  and	  models	  
	  
3-­‐1-­‐1	  Definition	  and	  Process	  of	  Turnaround	  
	  Definition	   of	   turnaround	   by	   Stanley	   J.	   Goodman	   is	   broad.	   According	   to	   his	  definition,	  turnaround	  could	  be	  applied	  to	  many	  other	  things	  besides	  company’s	  performance	   even	   for	   sports	   and	   diseases.	   An	   important	   point	   here	   is	   that	  turnaround	   is	   an	   improvement	   in	   performance	   “After	   decline”	   since	  improvement	  in	  performance	  without	  decline	  is	  just	  normal	  growth.	  	   	  
“A	   turnaround	   is	   to	   produce	  a	  noticeable	   and	   endurable	   improvement	   in	  
performance,	  to	  turnaround	  the	  trend	  of	  results	  from	  down	  to	  up,	  from	  not	  
good	   enough	   to	   clearly	   better,	   from	   underachieving	   to	   acceptable,	   from	  
losing	   to	   winning.”	   (Stanley	   J.	   Goodman,	   1982,	   “How	   to	   manage	   a	  
turnaround”	  New	  York,	  NY.	  Free	  Press.)	  	  Some	   researchers	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   pointed	   out	   that	   the	   definitions	   by	  Goodman	  are	  not	  measureable	   since	   there	   are	  no	   clear	   indicators	   to	   recognize	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“Noticeable	   improvement”,	   “Endurable	   improvement”	   and	   “Clearly	   better”.	   In	  such	   circumstances,	   later	   study	   by	   Pearce	   and	   Robbins	   (1992)	   provided	   a	  extended	   definition	   providing	   indicators.	   They	   added	   a	   new	   definition	   of	  turnaround	  as	  increasing	  ROI	  and	  ROS	  for	  at	  least	  continuous	  2	  years.	  
	  According	  to	  Pearce	  and	  Robbins…	  
Subsequent	  to	  the	  decline,	  turnaround	  firms	  achieved	  the	  followings:	  (1)	  at	  
least	  two	  consecutive	  years	  of	  absolute	  simultaneous	  increases	  in	  ROI	  and	  
ROS,	  at	  a	   rate	  greater	   than	   the	   industry	  average	  over	   this	  2-­‐year	  period;	  
and	  (2)	  a	  return	  to	  pre	  downturn	  (time	  1)	   levels	  of	  ROI	  and	  ROS.	   (Pearce	  
and	  Robbins,	  1992,	  Turnaround:	  Retrenchment	  and	  Recovery)	  	  However,	   since	   ROI	   and	   ROS	   are	   probably	   not	   the	   only	   indicators	   to	  measure	  firm’s	  performance,	  Goodman’s	  broad	  definition	  of	   turnaround	  seems	  better	   to	  analyze	   various	   industrial	   turnarounds	   in	   this	   research.	   Since	   every	   industry	  could	   have	   different	   combination	   of	   indicators	   peculiar	   to	   its	   industry,	  measurement	  of	  turnaround	  by	  ROI	  and	  ROS	  are	  not	  applied	  in	  this	  research.	  	  
3-­‐1-­‐2	  Process	  of	  Turnaround	  	  Out	  of	  various	  researches	  on	  the	  process	  of	  turnaround,	  the	  model	  studied	  here	  is	   the	   “Six	   stage	   model”	   developed	   by	   Peter	   Mckiernan	   (Turnarounds,	   Peter	  Mckiernan,	  The	  Oxford	  Handbook	  of	  STRATEGY	  Chapter	  27)	  because	  his	  model	  is	   an	   extended	  model	   based	   on	   pilot	   studies	   and	  widely	   covers	   the	   concept	   of	  previous	  researches.	  	  According	   to	  Peter	  Mckiernan,	  process	  of	  corporate	   turnaround	  consists	  of	  six-­‐stages,	  “Causes	  stage”,	  “Triggers	  stage”,	  “Diagnosis	  stage”,	  “Retrenchment	  stage”,	  “Recovery	  stage”	  and	  “Renewal	  stage”.	  He	  explored	  the	  first	  three	  stages	  (Causes,	  Triggers	   and	   Diagnosis)	   and	   the	   last	   stage	   (Renewal),	   which	   is	   the	   most	  significant	  part	  of	  his	  model.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  main	  two	  stages	  (Retrenchment	  and	  Recovery)	   that	  had	  been	  widely	  accepted,	  he	  added	   the	   four	   stages,	  which	  was	  developed	  by	  his	  research.	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Figure	  3.1	  -­‐	  Six	  stages	  of	  turnaround	  
	  
	  Source:	  Turnarounds:	  Peter	  Mckiernan	  (The	  Oxford	  Handbook	  of	  STRATEGY)	  	  
Six	  stages	  
1.	  Causes	  stage	  What	   firms	  have	   to	  do	   first	   is	   to	   identify	   the	   reason	  of	   decline.	  According	   to	  Peter	  Mckiernan,	  there	  are	  two	  types	  of	  causes	  that	  are	  Secondary	  cause	  and	  Primary	  cause.	  Secondary	  causes	  are	  surface	  problems	  and	  Primary	  causes	  are	  more	  fundamental	  relating	  to	  organizational	  problems.	  
2.	  Trigger	  stage	  Something	  must	  happen	  to	  trigger	  the	  change.	  Peter	  Mckiernan	  mentions	  that	  mangers	   tend	   to	   hope	   the	   cause	   is	   external	   or	   decline	   is	   cyclical	   in	   its	   early	  stage.	  	  The	  timing	  of	  triggering	  is	  therefore	  important	  
3.	  Diagnostic	  stage	  Firms	  have	  to	  diagnose	  the	  link	  between	  symptoms	  and	  the	  real	  causes.	  Peter	  Mckiernan	  points	  out	  that	  links	  are	  often	  complex	  and	  sometimes	  manipulated	  or	  window-­‐dressed	  especially	  when	  firms	  are	  in	  trouble.	  
4.	  Retrenchment	  stage	  Retrenchment	   is	   an	   initial	   response	   for	   firms	   in	   crisis	   to	   stabilize	   the	   firm’s	  financial	   condition	   by	   reducing	   expenses,	   cutting	   costs,	   selling	   assets,	   and	  reducing	  debt	  etc.	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5.	  Recovery	  stage	  Recovery	   stage	   is	   the	   next	   stage	   that	   the	   firms	   face	   after	   they	   achieved	  successful	   retrenchment.	   Peter	   Mckiernan	   argues	   that	   there	   are	   two	   major	  strategies	  that	  are	  Efficiency	  strategies	  and	  Entrepreneurial	  strategies.	  
6.	  Renewal	  stage	  Renewal	   is	   the	   completion	   of	   turnaround.	   However,	   according	   to	   Peter	  Mckiernan,	   it	   is	   not	   sufficient	   for	   good	   turnaround.	   To	   sustain	   its	   good	  performance,	  firms	  must	  acquire	  an	  ability	  to	  renew	  itself	  through	  continuous	  learning.	  	  
3-­‐1-­‐2	  Major	  Turnaround	  Models	  	  Out	   of	   various	   studies	   of	   conceptual	   turnaround	   models,	   three	   turnaround	  models	   are	   chosen	   here	   in	   order	   to	   acquire	   fundamental	   knowledge	   of	  turnaround	  models	  that	  is	  essential	  to	  create	  the	  original	  turnaround	  model.	  	  The	  major	  reason	  for	  selecting	  these	  three	  models	  is	  that	  all	  of	  the	  three	  models	  are	   based	   on	   examining,	   updating	   or	   expanding	   the	   previous	   models	   and	   are	  representing	   studies	   in	   each	   era,	   the	   1980s,	   the	   1990s,	   and	   the	   2000s.	   An	  important	  finding	  here	  is	  that	  these	  models	  are	  finally	  integrated	  into	  George	  A.	  Boyne’s	   3R	   model,	   which	   is	   the	   latest	   model,	   which	   is	   widely	   supported	   in	  current	  studies.	  	  
Turnaround	  Model	  One	  (1/3)	  
Hambrick	  and	  Schecter’s	  Turnaround	  Model	  (1983)	  
“Turnaround	  Strategies	  for	  Mature	  Industrial-­‐Product	  Business	  Units’	  ”	  	  Hambrick	   and	   Schecter	   developed	   their	   original	   turnaround	   model	   through	  study	   on	   three	   pilot	   researches	   by	   Schendel	   et	   at.	   (1975),	   Hofer	   (1980),	   and	  Bibeault	   (1982).	   They	   updated	   the	   previous	   model	   by	   examining	   their	  hypothesis	  by	  statistical	  data	  analysis	  in	  matured	  industries.	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As	   a	   result	   of	   regression	   analysis	   of	   strategic	   moves	   and	   change	   on	   ROI,	  Hambrick	   and	   Schecter	   found	   that	   “Short-­‐run	   turnaround	   success	   among	  
mature	   businesses	  would	   be	   associated	   primarily	  with	   improved	   efficiency	  
and	  retrenchment,	  rather	   than	  with	  product/market	   initiatives”	   (Hambrick	  
and	  Schecter,	  1983)	  	  
	  In	   other	   words,	   it	   was	   efficiency	   oriented	   moves,	   but	   not	   entrepreneurial	  initiatives	   that	   was	   associated	   with	   successful	   turnaround.	   Furthermore,	   they	  found	  three	  generic	  types	  of	  turnarounds	  that	  are	  Asset/Cost	  Surgery,	  Selective	  Product/Market	  Pruning,	  and	  Piecemeal	  moves.	  They	  argue	  that	  choices	  among	  these	  strategies	  are	  related	  with	  characteristics	  of	  the	  business.	  	  Hambrick	   and	   Schecter	   also	   mention	   that,	   Asset/Cost	   surgery	   was	   pursued	  primarily	   by	   business	   with	   low	   levels	   of	   capacity	   utilization;	   Selective	  Product/Market	   Pruning	   was	   undertaken	   primarily	   by	   businesses	   with	   high	  levels	  of	  capacity	  utilization;	  and	  Piecemeal	  strategy	  was	   followed	  primarily	  by	  business	  with	  high	  market	  share.	  	  
Turnaround	  Model	  Two	  (2/3)	  
Pearce	  and	  Robbins’	  model	  (1993)	  
“Toward	  Improved	  Theory	  and	  Research	  on	  Business	  Turnaround”	  
	  The	   turnaround	   model	   developed	   by	   Pearce	   and	   Robbins	   shows	   the	   inter-­‐relationship	   between	   causes	   and	   severity	   for	   the	   turnaround	   situation,	   and	  between	  retrenchment	  and	  recovery	  stages	  of	  the	  turnaround	  response.	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Figure	  3.2	  -­‐	  Turnaround	  Model	  by	  Peace	  and	  Robbins	  
	  
	  Source:	  Turnaround	  Process	  Model	  by	  Pearce	  and	  Robbins	   (Toward	   improved	  Theory	  and	  Research	  on	  Business	  Turnaround,	  1993)	  	  According	   to	  Pearce	  and	  Robbins,	   turnaround	  situations	  exist	  when	   firms	  have	  years	   of	   financial	   decline.	   Causes	   of	   decline	   are	   combination	   of	   external	   and	  internal	  factors.	  Severity	  level	  shows	  the	  immediacy	  of	  the	  result	  whether	  firms	  are	   going	   to	   bankruptcy	   or	   decline	   in	   sales.	   There	   are	   also	   two	   stages	   of	  turnaround	   responses	   to	   the	   crisis	   that	   are	   “Retrenchment”	   and	   “Recovery”.	  Retrenchment	   consists	   of	   a	   combination	   of	   cost	   cutting	   and	   asset	   reduction	   to	  stabilize	   the	   crisis	   and	   recovery	   consists	   of	   efficiency	   maintenance	   and	  entrepreneurial	  reconfiguration.	  	  Furthermore,	   Pearce	   and	   Robbins	   mention	   that	   “The	   primary	   causes	   of	   the	  
turnaround	   situation	   have	   been	   associated	   with	   the	   second	   phase	   of	   the	  
turnaround	  process”.	   	   It	  means	   firms	  declined	  primarily	  by	  external	  problems	  could	   turnaround	   by	   entrepreneurial	   strategies	  while	   firms	   declined	   primarily	  by	  internal	  problems	  could	  turnaround	  by	  efficiency	  improvement	  moves.	  	  	  
Turnaround	  Model	  Three	  (3/3)	  
George	  A.	  Boyne’s	  Turnaround	  Model	  (2006)	  “Strategies	  for	  	  
Public	  Service	  Turnaround	  -­‐	  Lessons	  from	  the	  Private	  Sector?”	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George	  A.	  Boyne	  defined	  three	  major	  generic	  strategies	  for	  turnaround	  that	  are	  “Retrenchment”,	  “Reorganization”,	  and	  “Repositioning”.	  	  
Retrenchment	  According	   to	   George	   A.	   Boyne,	   “Retrenchment	   consists	   of	   reduction	   in	   the	  
scope	   or	   size	   of	   an	   organization”	   and	   it	   is	   often	   taken	   in	   early	   stages	   of	  turnarounds.	  Boyne	  argues	  that	   there	  are	  two	  major	  arguments	  by	  researchers	  in	   terms	   of	   definition.	   	   One	   is	   to	   consider	   retrenchment	   as	   an	   initial	   step	   for	  turnaround	  while	  other	  consider	  it	  as	  an	  individual	  step	  separated	  from	  others.	  Boyne	  supports	  the	  later	  one	  since	  he	  found	  no	  empirical	  evidence	  showing	  the	  effect	  to	  the	  other	  two	  strategies.	  	  
Reorganization	  Boyne	   says	   “Reorganization	   is	   a	   broad	   description	   of	   any	   change	   in	   the	  
internal	   management	   or	   organization”.	   Purpose	   of	   reorganization	   is	   to	  support	   strategies	   of	   retrenchment	   or	   repositioning.	   	   It	   involves	   change	   in	  planning	   systems,	   the	   extent	   of	   decentralization,	   styles	   of	   human	   resources	  management,	  or	  organizational	  culture.	  	  
Repositioning	  Boyne	   also	   mention	   that	   “Retrenchment	   can	   be	   viewed	   as	   an	   efficiency	  
strategy	  while	  repositioning	  is	  an	  entrepreneurial	  strategy	  that	  emphasizes	  
growth	   and	   innovation”.	   	   The	   purpose	   of	   repositioning	   is	   to	   become	   more	  dominant	  in	  existing	  market	  or	  to	  diversify	  into	  new	  markets	  or	  products.	  	  
3-­‐2	  Absorptive	  Capacity	  (ACAP)	  Models	  	  As	  mentioned	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   this	   chapter,	   study	   of	   ACAP	  models	  was	   not	  initially	  planned	  for	  this	  research.	  However,	  during	  the	  research	  on	  turnaround	  models,	   it	   was	   found	   that	   an	   important	   function,	   which	   is	   essential	   for	  shipbuilder’s	   survival	  was	  missing.	  Although	   its	   “Ability	   to	   change”	   is	   essential	  for	   shipbuilder’s	   survival,	   the	  process	  of	  how	   firms	   recognize	  external	   changes	  
	   26	  
and	   how	   firms	   assimilate	   and	   utilize	   valuable	   information	   to	   create	   strategies	  was	  not	  included	  in	  any	  of	  the	  turnaround	  models.	  	  It	  was	  also	  argued	  by	  George	  A.	  Boyne	  that	  “A	  performance	  in	  decline	  in	  private	  
organizations	   is	  usually	  attributed	   to	  a	   lack	  of	   fit	  between	  an	  organization	  
and	  its	  environment”.	  However,	  the	  process	  of	  how	  firms	  realize	  the	  “lack	  of	  fit”	  are	   not	   shown	   in	   any	   of	   the	   turnaround	   models.	   And	   therefore,	   in	   order	   to	  complement	  the	  missing	  function	  of	  the	  turnaround	  model,	  study	  on	  ACAP	  was	  added	  to	  this	  research.	  	  
3-­‐2-­‐1	  Definition	  of	  ACAP	  and	  Major	  Models	  
	  
Definition	  of	  Absorptive	  Capacity	  (ACAP)	  Definition	  of	  Absorptive	  Capacity	  (ACAP)	  by	  Cohen	  and	  Levinthal	   is	  “An	  ability	  
of	   a	   firm	   to	   recognize	   the	   value	   of	   new,	   external	   information,	   assimilate	   it	  
and	   apply	   it	   to	   commercial	   end,	   which	   is	   critical	   to	   its	   innovative	  
capabilities”.	  	  
Major	  ACAP	  models	  There	  are	  various	   studies	  on	  ACAP	  models	   and	  out	  of	   those,	   two	  basic	  models	  plus	  one	  additional	  model	  are	  chosen	  here	  to	  acquire	  fundamental	  knowledge	  of	  ACAP.	   The	   two	   basic	   models	   are	   at	   first,	   Cohen	   and	   Levinthal’s	   ACAP	   model,	  which	   is	   the	   very	   basic	   model	   in	   the	   early	   stage	   of	   ACAP	   research.	   	   And	   the	  second	  ACAP	  model	   is	   Zahra	   and	  George’s	  model,	  which	   is	   an	   extended	  model	  based	  on	  Cohen	  and	  Levinthal’s	  model.	  The	  third	  model	  by	  Mark	  Easterby-­‐Smith,	  Manuel	  Graca,	  Elena	  Antonacopoulou	  and	  Jason	  Ferdinand	  is	  an	  extended	  model	  of	  Zahra	  and	  George’s	  model	  developed	  by	  empirical	  examinations.	  	  
	  
ACAP	  Model	  One	  (1/3)	  
Cohen	  and	  Levinthal’s	  ACAP	  model	  (1990)	  “Absorptive	  Capacity:	  	  
A	  New	  Perspective	  on	  Learning	  and	  Innovation”	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Definition	   of	   ACAP	   by	   Cohen	   and	   Levinthal	   (1990)	   is	   “An	   ability	   of	   firms	   to	  
recognize	  the	  value	  of	  new,	  external	   information,	  assimilate	   it,	  and	  apply	   it	  
to	  commercial	  ends”.	  They	  mention	  that	  there	  are	  two	  levels	  of	  ACAP,	  which	  is	  ACAP	   at	   “Individual	   level”	   and	   “Organizational	   level”.	   They	   also	   mention	   that	  firm’s	  ACAP	  relies	  on	  its	  prior	  related	  knowledge	  and	  therefore	  development	  of	  ACAP	  is	  associated	  with	  R&D	  investments.	  	  
ACAP	  at	  individual	  level	  Cohen	   and	   Levinthal	   (1990)	   say	   there	   are	   two	   types	   of	   individual	   capacity	  related	   to	   individual	   ACAP	   that	   are	   “Learning	   Capacity”	   and	   “Problem	   Solving	  Capacity”.	   	  And	  these	  two	  individual	  capacities	  are	  playing	  an	  important	  role	  to	  cumulate	  knowledge.	  They	  also	  emphasize	   the	   importance	  of	  diversity	  of	  prior	  knowledge	  because	  learning	  background	  increases	  incoming	  information.	  	  
ACAP	  at	  organizational	  level	  Cohen	  and	  Levinthal	  (1990)	  also	  say	  organizational	  ACAP	  is	  not	  simply	  the	  sum	  of	   the	   ACAP	   at	   individual	   level	   because	   the	   organization’s	   ability	   to	   exploit	   it	  affects	   the	   sum.	   What	   they	   focused	   on	   is	   the	   structure	   of	   communication	  between	   the	  external	  environment	  and	   the	  organization,	  which	   they	  call	   cross-­‐functional	  ACAP.	  For	  example,	  in	  order	  to	  assimilate	  new	  technologies	  into	  firms,	  firms	   need	   an	   internal	   staff	   who	   knows	   about	   technologies,	   organizational	  routines,	  and	  procedures	  capabilities,	  which	  is	  an	  cross-­‐functional	  ability.	  	  
Path	  dependence	  and	  ACAP	  According	   to	  Cohen	  and	  Levinthal	   (1990),	   “Accumulating	  ACAP	   in	  one	  period	  
will	   permit	   its	   more	   efficient	   accumulation	   in	   the	   next.	   By	   having	   already	  
developed	   some	   ACAP	   in	   a	   particular	   area,	   a	   firm	   may	   more	   readily	  
accumulate	  what	  additional	  knowledge	  it	  needs	  in	  the	  subsequent	  periods	  in	  
order	  to	  exploit	  any	  critical	  external	  knowledge	  that	  may	  become	  available	  
(Cohen	  and	  Levinthal,	  1990)”	  and	  this	  is	  what	  they	  call	  “Path	  dependence”.	  For	  example,	   if	   firms	   cease	   investment	   in	   R&D	   in	   one	   field,	   it	   will	   get	   harder	   to	  assimilate	  valuable	  information	  from	  the	  same	  field	  in	  the	  future.	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ACAP	  and	  R&D	  investment	  Cohen	  and	  Levinthal	  (1990)	  emphasize	  the	  importance	  of	  continuous	  investment	  in	   R&D	   since	   it	   contributes	   to	   develop	   firm’s	   ACAP.	   According	   to	   them,	  
“Technical	   change	   within	   the	   industry	   is	   often	   closely	   related	   to	   firm’s	  
ongoing	  R&D	  activity,	  a	   firm’s	  ability	   to	  exploit	  external	  knowledge	   is	  often	  
generated	  as	  a	  byproduct	  of	  its	  R&D”.	  
	  
Figure	  3.3	  -­‐	  Model	  of	  Absorptive	  capacity	  and	  R&D	  incentives	  
	  
	  Source:	  Cohen	  and	  Levinthal’s	  ACAP	  model	  (Absorptive	  Capacity:	  A	  New	  Perspective	  on	  Learning	  and	  Innovation,	  1990)	  	  The	   ACAP	  model	   developed	   by	   Cohen	   and	   Levinthal’s	   shows	   the	   role	   of	   ACAP	  affecting	   R&D	   spending.	   According	   to	   them,	   determinants	   affecting	   R&D	  spending	   are	   “Technological	   Opportunity”	   and	   “Appropriability”	   depending	   on	  firm’s	  “Competitor	  Interdependence”.	  	  
ACAP	  Model	  Two	  (2/3)	  
Zahra	  and	  George’s	  Model	  (2002)	  “Absorptive	  Capacity:	  	  
A	  Review,	  Reconceptualization,	  and	  Extension”	  	  While	  Cohen	  and	  Levinthal	  only	  mentioned	  investments	  in	  R&D	  to	  develop	  ACAP,	  other	   researchers	   including	   Zahra	   and	  George	   explored	  many	   other	   fields	   that	  could	  develop	  organizational	  ACAP.	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Definition	  of	  ACAP	  amended	  by	  Zahra	  and	  George’s	   is	  “A	  set	  of	  organizational	  
routines	   and	   processes	   by	   which	   firms	   acquire,	   assimilate,	   transform,	   and	  
exploit	   knowledge	   to	   produce	   a	   dynamic	   organizational	   capability”.	   (Zahra	  and	  George,	  2002)	  	  
Figure	  3.4	  -­‐	  A	  Model	  of	  ACAP	  by	  Zahra	  and	  George	  	  
	  
	  Source:	   Zahra	   and	   George’s	   ACAP	   Model	   (Absorptive	   Capacity:	   A	   Review,	  Reconceptualization,	  and	  Extension,	  2002)	  	  Figure	   3.4	   shows	   the	   process	   of	   how	   firms	  utilize	   its	   sources	   to	   “Acquire”	   and	  “Assimilate”	  valuable	  information	  from	  its	  sources	  and	  to	  how	  they	  “Transform”	  and	  “Exploit”	  it	  to	  create	  competitive	  advantages.	  According	  to	  Zahra	  and	  George,	  there	   are	   two	   type	   of	   ACAP	   by	   different	   capabilities	   that	   are	   “Potential	   ACAP	  (PACAP)”	   and	   “Realized	   ACAP	   (RACAP)”.	   PACAP	   comprises	   knowledge	  acquisition	  and	  assimilation	  while	  RACAP	  comprises	  knowledge	  transformation	  and	  exploitation.	  	  Definition	   of	   the	   four	   complementary	   capabilities	   by	   Zahra	   and	   George	   are	   as	  follows.	  	  
Four	  complementary	  capabilities	  
1.	  Acquisition	  capability	  Acquisition	   capability	   is	   firm’s	   capability	   to	   identify	   and	   acquire	   externally	  generated	  knowledge	  that	  is	  critical	  to	  its	  operations.	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2.	  Assimilation	  capability	  Assimilation	  capability	  is	  firm’s	  routines	  and	  processes	  that	  allow	  it	  to	  analyze,	  process,	   interpret,	   and	   understand	   the	   information	   obtained	   from	   external	  sources.	  
3.	  Transformation	  capability	  Transformation	   capability	   is	   firm’s	   capability	   to	   develop	   and	   refine	   the	  routines	   that	   facilitate	   combining	  existing	  knowledge	  and	  he	  newly	  acquired	  and	  assimilated	  knowledge.	  
4.	  Exploitation	  Exploitation	   is	   an	   organizational	   capability	   to	   incorporate	   acquired	   and	  transformed	  knowledge	  into	  its	  operations.	  	  Other	  five	  factors	  in	  Zahra	  and	  George’s	  ACAP	  model	  is	  as	  follows;	  	  
Five	  factors	  
1.	  External	  sources	  and	  knowledge	  complementarity	  Firms	  acquire	  knowledge	  from	  various	  external	  sources	  and	  it	  has	  a	  significant	  influence	  to	  PACAP.	  
2.	  Experience	  	  	  	  	  Firm’s	  past	  experience	  has	  cumulativeness	  and	  it	  is	  influencing	  PACAP.	  
3.	  Activation	  triggers	  	  	  	  	  Triggers	  are	  events	  that	  encourage	  firms	  to	  respond	  with.	  (Crises	  etc.)	  	  
4.	  Social	  integration	  mechanisms	  and	  the	  efficiency	  factor	  Social	   integration	   mechanisms	   are	   to	   reduce	   the	   gap	   between	   PACAP	   and	  RACAP,	  which	  is	  an	  efficiency	  increasing	  factor.	  
5.	  Regimes	  of	  appropriatability	  It	   is	   the	   institutional	   and	   industry	   dynamics	   that	   affect	   the	   firm’s	   ability	   to	  protect	  the	  advantages	  of	  new	  products	  or	  processes.	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3-­‐2-­‐2	  Other	  Discussions	  on	  ACAP	  	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  two	  major	  ACAP	  models	  studied	  above,	  another	  ACAP	  model	  including	   empirical	   examinations	   is	   chosen	   here	   because	   the	   two	   studies	   are	  both	  theoretical	  and	  have	  not	  included	  any	  practical	  examination	  to	  confirm	  the	  feasibility.	  	  
ACAP	  Model	  Three	  (3/3)	  
Mark	  Easterby-­‐Smith,	  Manuel	  Graca,	  Elena	  Antonacopoulou	  and	  
	  Jason	  Ferdinand’s	  Model	  	  “Absorptive	  Capacity	  in	  Practice:	  An	  	  
Empirical	  Examination	  of	  Zahra	  and	  George’s	  Model”	  
	  While	   numbers	   of	   researches	   regarding	   ACAP	   focus	   on	   secondary	   data	   and	  literature	   surveys,	  Mark	   Easterby-­‐Smith,	  Manuel	   Graca,	   Elena	   Antonacopoulou	  and	  Jason	  Ferdinand	  (later	  “The	  Authors”)	  focused	  on	  empirical	  examination	  to	  confirm	  feasibility	  of	  the	  ACAP	  model.	  The	  Authors	  conducted	  an	  examination	  of	  three	  firms	  in	  order	  to	  confirm	  feasibility	  of	  the	  Zahra	  and	  George’s	  ACAP	  model	  and	  developed	  an	  extended	  ACAP	  model.	  	  Table	  3.1	  shows	  the	  five	  factors	  of	  ACAP	  in	  the	  three	  firms	  chosen	  by	  the	  Authors.	  As	   summarized	   in	   the	   Table,	   all	   factors	   comprising	   ACAP	   are	   identified	   and	  therefore	  feasibility	  of	  Zahra	  and	  George’s	  ACAP	  model	  had	  been	  confirmed.	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Webco   : Small but fast growing IT company located in Northern England 
Healthco : A Hospital Trust in a rural part of Northern England 
Chemco  : A part of a multinational company located in Northern England 
 Source:	   Identified	   by	   the	   Author	   in	   the	   study	   of	   “Absorptive	   Capacity	   in	   Practice:	   An	  Empirical	  Examination	  of	  Zahra	  and	  George’s	  Model”	  written	  by	  Mark	  Easterby-­‐Smith,	  Manuel	  Graca,	  Elena	  Antonacopoulou	  and	  Jason	  Ferdinand	  by	  using	  the	  ACAP	  model	  	  In	   addition	   to	   confirm	   the	   feasibility	   of	   Zahra	   and	   George’s	   ACAP	   model,	   the	  Authors	  developed	  modifications	  in	  following	  three	  points	  towards	  an	  emended	  and	  extended	  ACAP	  model.	  	  
Figure	  3.5	  -­‐	  Amended	  and	  extended	  ACAP	  model	  
	  Source:	  ACAP	  Model	  by	  Mark	  Easterby-­‐Smith,	  Manuel	  Graca,	  Elena	  Antonacopoulou	  and	  Jason	  Ferdinand	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Modifications	  in	  three	  points	  
1.	  Timing	  and	  performance	  Zahra	  and	  George	   in	   fact	  mention	  that	  timing	   is	  an	   important	   factor	  affecting	  ACAP	   but	   it	   was	   not	   really	   emphasized.	   However,	   the	   Authors	   found	   the	  apparent	   importance	  of	   time	  dimension	  and	   therefore	  added	   this	   function	   in	  its	  extended	  ACAP	  model.	  
2.	  Politics	  The	  Authors	  mention	   that	   although	   political	   issues	   are	   not	   often	   featured	   in	  survey	   based	   researches,	   it	   should	   be	   included	   as	   one	   of	   the	   key	   issues	  influencing	   the	   potential	   of	   ACAP	   since	   in	   almost	   every	   interview	   held	  with	  managers	  and	  employees,	  political	  issues	  had	  been	  mentioned.	  
3.	  External	  competition	  The	   original	   ACAP	   model	   of	   Zahra	   and	   George	   (2002)	   identified	   external	  innovation	  as	  a	  major	  trigger	  for	  ACAP.	  However,	  the	  Authors	  found	  from	  their	  case	   studies	   that	   the	   original	   definition	   is	   too	   narrow.	   Therefore	   in	   the	  extended	  model,	  they	  defined	  it	  as	  the	  external	  competitive	  factors	  instead	  of	  external	  innovations.	  	  	  
3-­‐2-­‐3	  Necessity	  of	  ACAP	  For	  Turnaround	  
	  As	   it	   is	   already	  mentioned	   earlier	   in	   this	   chapter,	   necessity	   of	   integrating	   the	  concept	  of	  ACAP	  into	  the	  turnaround	  model	  is	  to	  complement	  the	  missing	  part	  of	  the	   turnaround	   model.	   It	   is	   argued	   by	   many	   researchers	   that	   turnaround	   is	  associated	   with	   firm’s	   “Ability	   to	   change”	   itself	   in	   response	   to	   environmental	  change.	   However	   the	   process	   of	   how	   firm’s	   ability	   works	   to	   recognize	   the	  environmental	   change	   and	   how	   they	   utilize	   information	   to	   create	   turnaround	  strategies	  are	  not	  shown	  in	  any	  model.	  	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   ACAP	   is	   defined	   as	   “Firm’s	   ability	   to	   recognize	   value	   of	  information,	   assimilate	   it	   and	  apply	   it	   to	   commercial	   ends”	   (Zahra	  and	  George,	  2002)	  and	  this	  is	  in	  fact	  the	  ability	  found	  missing	  in	  turnaround	  models.	  Thus,	  to	  complement	  the	  missing	  part	  of	   the	  turnaround	  models,	   it	  was	  considered	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  ACAP	  should	  be	  integrated	  into	  the	  turnaround	  model.	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An	   interesting	   finding	   here	   is	   that	   structure	   of	   the	   two	   major	   models	   (The	  turnaround	   model	   by	   Pearce	   and	   Robbins	   and	   the	   ACAP	   model	   by	   Zahra	   &	  George)	  has	  similarity.	  The	  two	  models	  consist	  of	  mainly	  three	  components	  that	  are	  “Input”,	  “Process”	  and	  “Output”.	  For	  example,	  the	  turnaround	  model	  consists	  of	  Input	  (=	  Internal	  &	  External	  factors),	  Process	  (=	  Level	  of	  severity/Turnaround	  response),	  and	  Output	  (=	  Recovery).	  	  	  In	   case	   of	   ACAP	   model,	   it	   consists	   of	   Input	   (=	   Internal	   &	   External	   sources)	   ,	  Process	   (=ACAP),	   and	   Output	   (=	   Competitive	   Advantage).	   And	   therefore,	   since	  the	  two	  models	  have	  similar	  structures,	  it	  became	  more	  confident	  that	  the	  ACAP	  model	  could	  be	  integrated	  smoothly	  into	  the	  turnaround	  model.	  	  
Figure	  3.6	  -­‐	  Structure	  of	  the	  two	  models	  (Input/process/output)	  
	  
	  Source:	   Turnaround	  model	   by	   Pearce	   and	   Robbins	   (1993)	   and	   ACAP	  model	   by	   Zahra	  and	  George	  (2002)	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Chapter	  4	  	  
Integrated	  3R-­‐ACAP	  Model	  and	  examination	  by	  three	  industries	  
	  
4-­‐1	  Integrated	  3R-­‐ACAP	  Model	  	  Literature	  research	  in	  three	  areas	  including	  definition	  of	  turnaround,	  process	  of	  turnaround,	  and	  major	   turnaround	  models	  were	  conducted	   in	  chapter	   three	   to	  create	  theoretical	  foundations	  to	  develop	  an	  original	  turnaround	  model	  for	  this	  research.	  	  	  As	   a	   result,	   it	   was	   found	   that	   an	   important	   ability	   required	   for	   shipbuilders’	  survival	   was	   missing	   in	   the	   turnaround	   models.	   The	   process	   of	   how	   firm’s	  “Ability	   to	   respond	   to	   change”	  works	   to	   recognize	   environmental	   changes	   and	  how	  they	  utilize	  valuable	  information	  to	  create	  strategies	  was	  not	  shown	  in	  any	  turnaround	  model.	  The	  concept	  of	  ACAP	  model	  was	  therefore	  integrated	  into	  the	  turnaround	  model	  to	  complement	  the	  missing	  part	  of	  the	  turnaround	  model.	  	  Following	  is	  the	  integrated	  3R-­‐ACAP	  model	  developed	  here,	  which	  is	  basically	  a	  combined	  model	  of	   the	  3R	  turnaround	  model	  by	  George	  A.	  Boyne’s	  3R	  and	   the	  ACAP	  model	   by	  Zahra	   and	  George.	  The	  model	   shows	   the	  process	  of	   how	   firms	  utilize	   its	  sources	   to	  assimilate	  (Potential	  ACAP)	  valuable	   information	  and	  how	  firms	   utilize	   (Realized	   ACAP)	   it	   to	   create	   3R	   strategies	   (Retrenchment,	  Reorganization,	  and	  Repositioning)	  to	  turnaround	  from	  crisis.	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Figure	  4.1	  -­‐	  Integrated	  3R-­‐ACAP	  Model	  
	  
	  Source:	  The	  Author’s	  original	  developed	  for	  this	  research	  
	  
4-­‐2	  Examination	  of	  The	  Model	  	  In	   this	   chapter,	   turnaround	   industries	   are	   selected	   in	   order	   to	   examine	   the	  Integrated	  3R-­‐ACAP	  model.	  The	  purpose	  is	  to	  examine	  whether	  the	  model	  works	  properly	  in	  empirical	  cases	  or	  if	  it	  needs	  modifications.	  Three	  industries	  chosen	  here	   are	   U.S.	   Copper	   Industry,	   British	   Steel	   Industry,	   and	   Brazilian	   Aircraft	  Industry	  and	  there	  are	  three	  reasons	  for	  selection.	   	  At	  first,	  its	  ability	  to	  change	  played	  an	  important	  role	  for	  its	  turnaround.	  And	  second,	  all	  achieved	  a	  dramatic	  recovery	  after	  serious	  decline.	  And	  third,	  government	  played	  an	  important	  role	  for	  development	  of	  these	  industries.	  	  	  Fortunately,	   there	   were	   already	   numbers	   of	   researches	   conducted	   on	  turnaround	   of	   these	   three	   industries	   and	   therefore	   researches	   focusing	  especially	  on	  strategic	  aspects	  of	  the	  cases	  were	  selected	  for	  the	  examination.	  	  
4-­‐2-­‐1	  Three	  Turnaround	  Industries	  	  At	   first,	   introduction	   of	   each	   turnaround	   case	   including	   its	   history,	   crisis	   they	  faced	   and	   strategies	   taken	   for	   turnaround	   is	   done	   in	   order	   to	   acquire	   basic	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knowledge	   of	   backgrounds.	   And	   then,	   based	   on	   the	   facts,	   examination	   by	   the	  integrated	  3R-­‐ACAP	  model	  is	  done	  by	  identifying	  the	  factors	  of	  3R-­‐ACAP	  model.	  	  	  
Turnaround	  Case	  One	  (1/3)	  -­‐	  U.S.	  Copper	  Industry	  	  
“Innovation,	  Productivity	  Growth,	  	  
and	  the	  Survival	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Copper	  Industry”	  	  	  
John	  E.	  Tilton	  and	  Hans	  H.	  Landsberg	  (1997)	  
	  
Brief	  history	  According	   to	   Tilton	   and	   Landsberg,	   mining	   was	   widely	   considered	   as	   an	   old	  industry	  with	  mature	   and	   stable	   technologies.	   	   And	   therefore,	   those	  who	  have	  the	  best	  deposits	  are	  always	  believed	  to	  be	  most	  competitive.	  However,	  mining	  in	  the	  United	  States	  called	  into	  question	  this	  conventional	  view.	  After	  leading	  the	  market	  for	  decades,	  it	  once	  experienced	  a	  serious	  decline.	  However,	  it	  achieved	  a	  dramatic	  revival	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  1990s	  and	  the	  U.S.	   is	  mining	  more	  copper	  than	  the	  1970s.	  	  
Crisis	  Since	  1970,	  mine	  output	  in	  the	  U.S.	  gradually	  had	  fallen	  until	  1985	  and	  its	  share	  in	   the	   world	   market	   shrunk	   from	   30	   percent	   to	   17	   percent.	   	   Following	   this	  recession,	  employment	  fell	  into	  13	  thousand,	  which	  was	  70	  percent	  decline	  from	  its	   1970	   level.	   Only	   few	   producers	   were	   covering	   it’s	   full	   production	   cost.	   	   In	  spite	  of	   its	  efforts,	  breakeven	  costs	  did	  not	   fall	   as	  much	  as	   the	  price	  of	   copper.	  Numbers	  of	  mines	  therefore	  curtailed	  production	  or	  shut	  down	  completely.	  	  	  
Strategies	  taken	  for	  turnaround	  Tilton	  and	  Landsberg	  analyzed	  that	  there	  are	  five	  possible	  determinants,	  which	  contributed	   to	   U.S.	   copper	   industry’s	   turnaround;	   first	   an	   increase	   in	   the	  production	  costs	  of	   foreign	  producers,	   second	  a	   surge	   in	   copper	  prices,	   third	  a	  rise	  in	  byproduct	  revenues,	  fourth	  a	  decline	  in	  the	  real	  wages	  of	  domestic	  copper	  workers,	  and	  fifth	  an	  increase	  in	  labor	  productivity.	  It	  will	  be	  able	  to	  say	  that	  the	  fourth	   and	   fifth	   determinants	   will	   be	   a	   positive	   reaction	   taken	   by	   firms	  while	  others	  are	  passive	  ones	  that	  are	  not	  manageable.	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Turnaround	  As	   a	   result	   of	   the	   strategies	   taken	   for	   turnaround,	   the	   copper	   mine	   output	  increased	  to	  1.89	  million	  tons,	  which	  amounts	  21	  percent	  above	  its	  1970s	  level	  and	  72	  percent	  above	  its	  1985	  level.	  The	  U.S.	  share	  of	  western	  world	  production	  recovered	   to	  23	  percent	   that	   is	   its	  1975	   level.	  Breakeven	  costs	  and	   the	  market	  price	  had	  widened	  enough	  to	  make	  the	  U.S.	  copper	  industry	  once	  again	  profitable.	  
	  
Figure	  4.2	  -­‐	  Factors	  contributed	  to	  the	  U.S.	  Copper	  Industry’s	  Turnaround	  
	  
	  Source:	  The	  Author’s	  original	  based	  on	  the	  case	  study	  on	  the	  “Innovation,	  Productivity	  Growth,	  and	  the	  Survival	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Copper	  Industry”	  written	  by	  John	  E.	  Tilton	  and	  Hans	  H.	  Landsberg	  (1997)	  
	  
Five	  determinants	  of	  the	  turnaround	  
1.	  Increase	  in	  production	  cost	  of	  foreign	  producers	  A	  result	  of	  sharp	  appreciation	  of	  dollar	  and	  it	  lowered	  U.S.	  coppers	  production	  cost	  when	  calculated	  in	  foreign	  currency.	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2.	  Surge	  in	  copper	  price	  Caused	  by	   cyclical	   fluctuation	   in	   copper	  price	   and	   the	  balance	  of	   supply	   and	  demand	  
3.	  Rise	  in	  byproduct	  revenues	  Revenues	  by	  selling	  byproducts	  such	  as	  gold,	  silver,	  molybdenum,	  and	  others	  helped	  U.S.	  copper	  producers	  to	  lower	  its	  costs.	  
4.	  Decline	  in	  real	  wage	  of	  workers	  	  	  	  	  Workers	  wage	  fell	  more	  than	  25	  percent	  between	  1984	  and	  1989	  
5.	  Increase	  in	  labor	  productivity	  Hours	  required	  to	  mine	  a	  ton	  of	  copper	  fell	  over	  50	  percent	  between	  1980	  and	  1986	  	  Tilton	  and	  Landsberg	  also	  mention	   that	   there	  are	   three	   factors,	  which	  affected	  labor	   productivity.	   At	   first,	   capital	   and	   other	   inputs	   per	   worker,	   and	   second,	  quality	  of	  copper	  deposits,	  and	  third	  innovative	  activity	  and	  new	  technology.	  	  
Three	  factors	  affected	  labor	  productivity	  
1.	  Capital	  and	  other	  inputs	  per	  worker	  Investments	   in	   structures	   and	   equipment	   with	   new	   technologies	   and	   other	  innovative	   developments	   had	   a	  major	   impact	   on	   both	   labor	   and	  multifactor	  productivity	  since	  1980.	  	  
2.	  Quality	  of	  copper	  deposits	  Quality	   of	   copper	   deposits	   fell	   since	   the	   mid	   1980s	   due	   to	   shift	   from	  underground	   mining	   toward	   leach	   mining.	   High	   grade	   associated	   with	  underground	   mining	   reflect	   greater	   cost	   while	   low	   grades	   of	   leach	   mining	  reflect	  lower	  cost	  and	  thus,	  change	  in	  grade	  increased	  labor	  productivity.	  	  
3.	  Innovative	  activity	  and	  new	  technology	  Innovative	   activity	   and	   new	   technology	   was	   the	   most	   important	   one	  contributed	  to	  growth	  in	  labor	  productivity.	  New	  processing	  technology	  called	  SX-­‐EW	   technology,	   which	   is	   highly	   productive	   and	   suitable	   to	   mine	   lower	  grade	  copper	  was	  emerged.	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Turnaround	  Case	  Two	  (2/3)	  -­‐	  British	  Steel	  Industry	  
“A	  Turnaround	  under	  Public	  Ownership”	  
Christopher	  Beauman	  (1996)	  
	  
History	  Christopher	   Beauman	   argues	   that	   the	   turnaround	   of	   British	   Steel	   Corporation	  (BSC)	   is	   one	   of	   the	  most	   successful	   cases	   of	   turnaround	   in	   the	   British	   history	  followed	   by	   subsequent	   privatization.	   BSC	   was	   established	   in	   1967	   as	   a	  nationalized	   company	   by	   integrating	   fourteen	   UK	   steel	   companies.	   Aim	   of	  nationalization	  was	   to	   improve	   competitiveness	  of	   the	  British	   steel	   industry	   in	  global	  market.	  In	  1971	  BSC	  had	  58.5%	  of	  the	  domestic	  market	  share	  and	  the	  rest	  was	  occupied	  with	  private	  companies	  (31.3%)	  and	  imports	  (10.2%).	  	  
Crisis	  Although	   BSC	   made	   a	   profit	   of	   £72m	   in	   1974/75,	   steel	   consumption	   fell	  gradually	  through	  1974	  and	  1975	  because	  of	  the	  oil	  crisis.	  What	  made	  it	  worse	  was	   the	   UK’s	   economic	   crisis	   in	   1976.	   Due	   to	   rapid	   decline	   in	   UK	   steel-­‐using	  industries,	   delivery	   of	   steel	   finally	   dropped	   40%	   during	   1974	   and	   1984.	  According	   to	   Christopher	   Beauman,	   the	   oil	   crisis	   also	   had	   another	   long-­‐term	  effect	  on	   increasing	  BSC’s	  energy	  cost	   for	  steel	  production.	   	  And	  therefore,	  BSC	  finally	   found	   it	   impossible	   to	   adjust	   its’	   fixed	   costs	   to	   the	   new	   commercial	  environment.	  	  
Strategies	  taken	  for	  turnaround	  From	  1977	  to	  1980,	  BSC	  focused	  on	  reducing	  manned	  capacity.	  They	  closed	  all	  of	  its	  open-­‐hearth	   sites	   and	   reduced	  manned	   capacity	   from	  25mt	   to	  15mt.	  At	   the	  same	   time,	   BSC	   was	   considering	   to	   change	   its	   labor	   system	   fundamentally.	  	  However,	   the	   labor	   unions	   strongly	   opposed	   to	   the	   change	   and	   therefore	   it	  finally	   lead	   to	   a	   national	   strike.	   After	   the	   strike,	   BSC’s	   manpower	   fell	   from	  175,000	   to	   130,000	   and	   as	   a	   result,	   reduction	   in	   capacity	   was	   achieved	  unexpectedly	  sin	  a	  very	  short	  period.	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The	   next	   approach	   taken	   was	   the	   “Slim-­‐line”	   approach	   to	   reduce	   manpower	  costs.	  For	  example,	  manning	   in	  Port	  Talbot	  was	  reduced	   from	  12,000	   to	  5,000,	  while	   in	  Llanwern,	   it	  was	  reduced	   from	  9,000	   to	  4,500.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  dramatic	  reduction,	  manpower	   costs	  had	   fallen	   from	  30%	   in	   the	   late	  1970s	   to	  22.5%	   in	  the	  late	  1980s.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  BSC	  appointed	  board	  members	  from	  outside	  in	  order	  to	  develop	  fundamentally	  new	  strategies.	  As	  a	  result,	  BSC	  realized	  various	  hidden	  customer’s	  needs	  that	  are	  not	  homogeneous.	  	  And	  therefore,	  they	  decided	  to	   change	   its	   strategies	   from	   achieving	   economic	   of	   scale	   to	   dealing	   with	  customer’s	  needs	  precisely.	  	  
Turnaround	  Thanking	   to	   strategies	   taken	   to	   improve	   productivity,	   BSC’s	   profit	   changed	  direction	   from	   downturn	   to	   upturn	   in	   1981.	   	   Although	   BSC’s	   environment	   in	  early	  1980s	  was	  not	  favorable	  due	  to	  steel	  crisis	  and	  high	  exchange	  rate	  until	  the	  mid	   1980s	   they	   became	   profitable.	   Further	   growth	   from	   the	   late	   1980s	   was	  pushed	  up	  by	  improvement	  in	  price	  levels	  thanking	  to	  low	  exchange	  rate.	  	  
Figure	  4.3	  -­‐	  BSC’s	  profit	  from	  the	  1970s	  through	  the	  1990s	  
	  
	  Source:	  “A	  Turnaround	  under	  Public	  Ownership”	  Christopher	  Beauman	  (1996)	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Turnaround	  Case	  Three	  (3/3)	  -­‐	  Brazilian	  Aircraft	  Industry	  
“EMBRAER:	  From	  national	  champion	  to	  global	  player”	  
Andrea	  Goldstein	  (2002)	  	  
History	  Andrea	  Goldstein	  mentions	   that	   Latin	  America	   had	  been	   considered	   for	   a	   long	  time	   as	   a	   region	   having	   inability	   to	   foster	   big	   firms	   that	   can	   compete	   with	  European,	  North	  American,	  and	  East	  Asians.	  From	  this	  point,	  Brazil’s	  Embraer	  is	  a	  rare	  private	  company,	  which	  ranks	  in	  the	  worlds	  number	  three	  competing	  with	  its	  Canadian	  rival	  Bondardier.	  	  Embraer	   started	   as	   a	   state-­‐owned	   company	   (ex.	   Brazilian	   Aeronautical	  Corporation)	   in	   1969	   by	   having	   provided	   various	   advantages	   by	   the	  ministry.	  For	   example,	   support	   by	   financial	   backups,	   regulations,	   and	   international	  responsibilities	   had	   been	   provided.	   Production	   started	   in	   the	   1970s	   in	   co-­‐operation	  with	  foreign	  partners.	  As	  they	  didn’t	  have	  had	  advanced	  technologies,	  they	   focused	   on	   assembling	   the	   final	   product	   rather	   than	   designing	   and	  manufacturing	  components	  by	  themselves.	  Its	  target	  segment	  in	  the	  market	  was	  a	  small-­‐size	  turbo-­‐prop	  plane	  that	  could	  operate	  safely	  in	  harsh	  weather.	  	  And	  in	  1982,	  its	  product	  “Bandeirante”	  became	  the	  third	  in	  the	  U.S.	  market	  of	  10-­‐20	  seat	  commuters.	  	  
Crisis	  Andrea	   Goldstein	   says	   that	   Embraer	   was	   not	   affected	   by	   the	   1982	   economic	  crisis	  until	  the	  1990s.	  Its	  new	  30	  seats	  commuter	  was	  successfully	  launched	  and	  Embraer’s	   business	   looked	   stable.	   However,	   the	   Government’s	   decision	   to	  discontinue	   the	   finance	   fund	   to	   Embraer	   brought	   them	   the	   crisis.	   Despite	   its	  efforts	   to	   diversify	   into	   services	   and	   other	   activities,	   Embraer	   made	   a	   loss	   of	  US$310	  million	   in	  1994	  and	   its	  position	   in	  Brazil’s	  export	  market	   fell	   to	   thirty-­‐eighth.	   And	   finally	   in	   1992,	   Embraer	   was	   listed	   in	   a	   list	   of	   State-­‐owned	  companies	  that	  are	  going	  to	  be	  sold.	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Strategies	  taken	  for	  turnaround	  In	   1994,	   a	   consortium	   bought	   a	   controlling	   45%	   stake	   for	   US$	   89	  million	   and	  Embraer	  started	  as	  a	  private	  company.	  The	  new	  owners	  hired	  outside	  executives	  and	  half	  of	  the	  executives	  became	  outsiders.	  What	  they	  first	  did	  was	  outsourcing	  of	  jobs	  and	  as	  a	  result	  they	  dismissed	  white-­‐collar	  workers	  and	  engineers.	  	  Until	  the	  end	  of	  1996,	   the	  payroll	   fell	   from	  6,087	  in	  1994	  to	  3,849	  in	  1996.	  Embraer	  also	   signed	   a	   risk-­‐sharing	   agreement	   with	   suppliers	   to	   develop	   and	   produce	  equipment	   together.	   And	   this	   deal	   gave	   Embraer’s	   access	   to	   important	  technological	  advances	  in	  the	  field	  of	  new	  materials	  and	  design.	  	  They	  restarted	  the	  project	  for	  regional	  jets	  that	  had	  been	  suspended	  for	  years.	  It	  was	  because	   they	   found	  an	  emerging	  demand	  by	   for	   “Feeder	  carriers”	  by	  “Hub	  and	   Spokes”	   relations	   accelerated	   by	   industrial	   liberalization.	   The	   market	   for	  regional	   jets	   has	   grown	   by	   more	   than	   50%	   between	   1998	   and	   1999.	   Its	   new	  “Feeder	   carrier”	   called	   ERJ=145	   was	   lighter,	   cheaper	   to	   buy	   and	   15%	   less	  expensive	   to	  operate	   than	   its	  rival.	   	   It	   therefore	   took	  only	   four	  years	   to	  deliver	  300	  jets	  while	  its	  rival	  took	  seven	  years.	  	  
Turnaround	  As	  a	  result	  of	  strategies	  taken,	  Embraer	  returned	  to	  profitability	  in	  1998	  after	  11	  consecutive	  years	  in	  loss.	  Employees	  grown	  to	  over	  10,000	  in	  2001	  and	  exports	  accounts	   for	   90%	   of	   total	   sales	   to	   lead	   sales	   in	   the	  world	  market	   for	   regional	  aircraft.	  	  
4-­‐2-­‐2	  Examination	  by	  The	  Integrated	  3R-­‐ACAP	  Model	  	  Introduction	   of	   the	   three	   industries	   are	   done	   as	   above	   and	   therefore	   the	   next	  step	  is	  to	  examine	  the	  integrated	  3R-­‐ACAP	  model	  in	  the	  three	  industries.	  In	  order	  to	  confirm	   feasibility	  of	   the	  model,	   the	  eight	   factors	   (Internal	   sources,	  External	  sources,	   Potential	   ACAP,	   Realized	   ACAP,	   Retrenchment,	   Reorganization,	   and	  Repositioning)	   of	   the	   model	   are	   identified	   at	   first.	   And	   then,	   modifications	  toward	  an	  improved	  3R-­‐ACAP	  model	  will	  be	  done	  if	  any	  infeasible	  factors	  were	  found.	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Sources	  (Internal	  &	  external)	  and	  triggers	  In	  case	  of	   the	  U.S.	  Copper	   industry,	   its	  knowledge	  and	  experience	  accumulated	  through	  decades	  as	  the	  world’s	  largest	  producer	  of	  copper	  was	  identified	  as	  the	  internal	  sources.	   	  And	   its	  network	  within	  regional	  clusters	  and	  network	  among	  different	  clusters	  were	  identified	  as	  the	  external	  sources.	  What	  triggered	  it	  was	  global	   competitions	   with	   competitors	   not	   only	   having	   low	   cost	   advantage	   but	  also	  having	  abundant	  deposit	  of	  high-­‐grade	  coppers.	  What	  made	  it	  worse	  was	  the	  declining	  grade	  of	  copper	  mined	  in	  the	  U.S.	  	  Since	  they	  mined	  the	  highest	  quality	  copper	   first	   to	   maximize	   shareholders	   value,	   quality	   of	   remaining	   deposits	  declined.	  	  	  In	   the	   British	   Steel	   industry,	   knowledge	   and	   experience	   accumulated	   through	  decades	  as	  a	  nationalized	  corporation	  by	   the	  Labor	  Government	  was	   identified	  as	   its	   internal	   sources.	  Fourteen	  steel	   companies	  were	  merged	   to	  establish	   the	  corporation	   and	   therefore	   its	   sources	   had	   diversity.	   Relation	   with	   customers	  including	   shipbuilding	   industry	   and	   automobile	   industry	   was	   the	   external	  sources	   to	   develop	   its	   technological	   background.	  What	   triggered	   it	  was	   the	   oil	  crisis	  in	  1973	  and	  UK’s	  economic	  crisis	  since	  1976.	  	  As	   for	   the	   Brazilian	   Aircraft	   Industry,	   knowledge	   and	   experience	   accumulated	  though	  decades	  as	  a	  state	  owned	  company	  was	  identified	  as	  its	  internal	  sources.	  Since	   the	   Government	   could	   not	   afford	   importing	   military	   aircrafts	   due	   to	  security	  reasons,	  various	  restrictions	  during	  this	  period	  fostered	  accumulation	  of	  sources.	   Strong	   relation	   with	   the	   Brazilian	   Armed	   Forces	   and	   Export	   Finance	  Funds	   (FINEX)	  were	   identified	   as	   the	   external	   sources	   they	   had.	   Relation	   and	  network	   with	   parts	   suppliers	   was	   also	   an	   external	   source.	   And	   finally,	   what	  triggered	  it	  are	  the	  1982	  economic	  crisis	  and	  industry	  liberalization.	  	  	  
PACAP	  and	  RACAP	  As	  defined	  by	  Zahra	  and	  George,	  there	  are	  two	  types	  of	  ACAP	  that	  are	  “Potential	  ACAP”	  and	  “Realized	  ACAP”.	  According	  to	  them,	  PACAP	  is	  defined	  as	  firms	  ability	  to	   “Acquire”	   and	   “Assimilate”	   information	   from	   its	   sources,	   while	   RACAP	   is	  defined	   as	   firms	   ability	   to	   “Transform”	   and	   “Exploit”	   information	   to	   create	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competitive	   advantage.	  However,	   to	  make	   two	  ACAPs	  more	   visible	   in	   practical	  cases,	   it	   was	   redefined	   here	   that	   PACAP	   stands	   for	   “What	   was	   the	   valuable	  information	   they	   got”	   and	   RACAP	   stands	   for	   “How	   they	   understood	   the	  information	  and	  used	  it”.	  	  In	  the	  U.S.	  Copper	  Industry,	  there	  were	  three	  important	  information,	  which	  was	  assimilated	  by	   its	  PACAP.	  At	   first,	   the	  new	  technology	  called	  SX-­‐EW	  technology	  that	   is	   suitable	   to	   process	   low-­‐grade	   copper	   efficiently	   was	   emerged.	   	   And	  second,	  variety	  of	  needs	  not	  only	  requiring	  high-­‐grade	  copper	  but	  also	  low	  and	  middle-­‐grade	  copper	  was	  found.	  And	  third,	  the	  actual	  grade	  of	  copper	  mined	  in	  the	  U.	  S.	  declined.	  By	  utilizing	  these	  valuable	  information,	  what	  they	  decided	  to	  do	  is	  to	  change	  its	  strategy	  from	  being	  a	  high-­‐grade	  copper	  producer	  to	  low-­‐end	  copper	  producer,	  which	  was	  its	  RACAP.	  	  In	   the	   British	   Steel	   Industry,	   there	   were	   two	   important	   information	   that	   was	  assimilated	   by	   its	   PACAP.	   At	   first,	   it	   was	   found	   that	   there	   are	   many	   plants	  producing	  not	   large	  amount	  of	  steel	  and	   it	  was	  spreading	  over	  several	  regions.	  	  This	  was	   in	   fact	   not	   efficient	   to	   achieve	   economic	   of	   scale.	   And	   second,	   rise	   in	  customer’s	  manufacturing	   standard	  was	   found	  and	   therefore	  product	   for	  high-­‐end	  customers	  was	  emphasized.	  What	  they	  decided	  to	  do	  by	  using	  these	  valuable	  information	   is	   to	   change	   its	   strategy	   from	   achieving	   economic	   of	   scale	   to	  matching	  customer’s	  needs	  precisely,	  which	  was	  its	  RACAP.	  	  	  In	   the	   Brazilian	   Aircraft	   Industry,	   “Hub	   and	   spokes”	   development	   by	   industry	  liberalization	  was	  the	  valuable	  information	  assimilated	  by	  PACAP.	  By	  using	  this	  information,	  they	  predicted	  the	  emerging	  market	  of	  “Feeder	  carriers”	  (small	  jets)	  between	  the	  Hub	  and	  Spokes,	  which	  was	  its	  RACAP.	  	  
3R	  (Retrenchment	  /	  Reorganization	  /	  Repositioning)	  In	   the	   U.S.	   Copper	   industry,	   major	   retrenchment	   was	   reduction	   in	   number	   of	  employees.	   Numbers	   of	   mines	   curtailed	   production	   or	   closed	   completely	   and	  employment	   of	   the	  whole	   industry	   fell	   to	   almost	   70	   percent	   in	   15	   years	   since	  1970.	  Reorganization	  of	   core	  mining	   technologies	  was	  also	   identified.	  The	  new	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mining	   technology	  called	  SX-­‐EW	  technology	  emerged	  and	  they	  replaced	   it	  with	  the	  existing	  technology.	  The	  new	  technology	  was	  an	  innovative	  technology	  that	  could	  improve	  productivity	  dramatically.	  However,	  it	  was	  not	  suitable	  to	  process	  high-­‐grade	  copper	  but	  suitable	  to	  process	  low	  &	  middle-­‐grade	  copper.	  What	  they	  finally	  decided	   to	  do	   is	   to	  change	  strategies	   from	  being	  a	  high-­‐end	  producer	   to	  low	  &	  middle-­‐end	  producer,	  which	  was	  realignment	  of	  strategy.	  By	  reorganizing	  one	   of	   its	   core	   technologies	   for	   production,	   they	   succeeded	   to	   reposition	  themselves	  to	  achieve	  turnaround.	  	  In	   case	   of	   the	  British	   Steel	   Industry,	   the	  major	   retrenchment	  was	   reduction	   in	  number	   of	   employees.	   Due	   to	   serious	   recession	   by	   the	   oil	   crisis	   and	   the	   UK’s	  economic	   crisis,	   it	   decided	   to	   improve	   manned	   capacity	   per	   products	   by	  productivity-­‐linked	   pay	   system.	  However,	   the	   labor	   union	   opposed	   strongly	   to	  this	   change	   and	   called	   a	   national	   strike.	   The	   labor	   union	   finally	   accepted	   the	  change	  but	   in	   the	   first	  half	  of	  1980,	  number	  of	  employees	   fell	   from	  175,000	   to	  130,000.	   As	   a	   result	   of	   reduction	   in	   number	   of	   employees,	   retrenchment	   in	  productivity	   cost	   was	   achieved	   unexpectedly.	   Reorganization	   of	   the	   board	  members	  was	  also	  identified.	  The	  chairman	  decided	  to	  appoint	  board	  members	  from	  outside	  of	  the	  steel	  industry	  to	  get	  broader	  view	  in	  business	  management.	  Those	  who	  came	  from	  nuclear	  industries,	  banks,	  industrialist,	  etc.	  were	  expected	  to	  provide	  fundamentally	  new	  ideas.	  As	  a	  result,	  they	  found	  hidden	  demands	  in	  the	  market,	  which	  they	  were	  not	  able	  to	  realize	  before.	  They	  changed	  focus	  from	  achieving	  economic	  of	  scale	  to	  matching	  customer’s	  needs	  precisely,	  which	  will	  is	  identified	  as	  repositioning.	  	  In	  the	  Brazilian	  Aircraft	  Industry,	  major	  retrenchment	  was	  reduction	  in	  number	  of	   employees.	  Due	   to	   late	   impact	   of	   the	   1982	   economic	   crisis	   in	   the	  1990s,	   its	  financial	   condition	   declined	   seriously.	   After	   privatization,	   they	   decided	   to	   cut	  1,200	  white-­‐collar	  employees	  and	  500	  engineer	  and	  workers	  in	  1995.	  As	  a	  result	  of	   reduction	   in	   number	   of	   employees,	   production	   cost	   dropped	   dramatically.	  Reorganization	   of	   board	   executives	   was	   also	   identified.	   Since	   it	   started	   as	   a	  private	   company,	   new	   owners	   began	   hiring	   outside	   executives.	   As	  well	   as	   the	  British	   Steel	   Industry’s	   case,	   the	  purpose	  was	   to	   get	   broader	   external	   network	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and	   points	   of	   views	   by	   hiring	   outside	   executives.	   As	   a	   result,	   it	   succeeded	   to	  change	   itself	   from	   being	   an	   assembler	   by	   license	   contract	   with	   toward	   a	  producer	   by	   risk-­‐sharing	   contract.	   Repositioning	   from	   licenser	   to	   producer	  greatly	  contributed	   to	   its	   turnaround	  by	  providing	   the	  company	  with	  access	   to	  important	  technological	  backgrounds	  of	  materials	  and	  designs.	  	  	  
4-­‐2-­‐3	  Findings	  and	  Modifications	  	  It	  was	   confirmed	   by	   examinations	   that	   the	   3R-­‐ACAP	  model	   is	   applicable	   to	   all	  turnaround	  cases.	  The	  model	  worked	  properly	  to	  identify	  all	  of	  the	  eight	  factors	  (Internal	   sources,	   External	   sources,	   Triggers,	   Potential	   ACAP,	   Realized	   ACAP,	  Retrenchment,	   Reorganization,	   and	   Repositioning)	   comprising	   turnaround	  strategies.	  Feasibility	  of	  the	  3R-­‐ACAP	  model	  has	  now	  proved	  in	  practical	  cases.	  	  There	   were	   three	   major	   findings	   from	   the	   examination	   that	   required	  modifications	  to	  the	  3R-­‐ACAP	  model.	  Modifications	  are	  at	   first,	  change	   in	  order	  of	  3R,	  and	  second	  the	  direct	  relation	  between	  reorganization	  and	  repositioning,	  and	   third	   the	   word	   “Realignment”	   instead	   of	   “Repositioning”	   was	   found	  more	  appropriate	  word	  to	  use.	  	  
Figure	  4.4	  -­‐	  Modified	  3R-­‐ACAP	  model	  
	  Source:	  The	  Author’s	  original	  developed	  for	  this	  research	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Three	  modifications	  toward	  an	  improved	  3R-­‐ACAP	  model	  
1.	  Change	  in	  order	  of	  3R	  Although	   many	   researchers	   including	   Pearce	   and	   Robbins	   considered	  “Retrenchment”	   as	   an	   initial	   reaction	   of	   firms	   to	   stabilize	   the	   crisis,	   George	   A.	  Boyne	  who	  developed	  the	  3R	  turnaround	  model	  have	  not	  support	  this	  definition.	  Boyne	   considered	   it	   as	   an	   isolated	   strategy	   because	   he	   could	   not	   confirm	   any	  empirical	   evidences.	   However,	   result	   of	   examinations	   in	   the	   three	   industries	  shows	  that	  retrenchment	  was	  in	  fact	  the	  initial	  action	  taken	  by	  firms	  to	  stabilize	  the	   crisis.	   And	   therefore,	   the	   order	   of	   3R	   (Retrenchment	   comes	   first	   and	  Reorganization/Repositioning	  follows)	  was	  modified.	  	  
2.	  Reorganization	  works	  for	  repositioning	  (realignment)	  According	   to	   George	   A.	   Boyne,	   the	   role	   of	   Reorganization	   is	   to	   support	  retrenchment	  and	  repositioning.	  However,	  it	  was	  found	  through	  the	  examination	  here	  that	  no	  relation	  exists	  with	  retrenchment	  but	  only	  with	  repositioning.	  	  
3.	  Realignment	  instead	  of	  repositioning	  
	  
Figure	  4.5	  -­‐	  Image	  of	  the	  words	  “Repositioning”	  	  
and	  “Realignment”	   The	   two	   worlds	  “Repositioning”	   and	  “Realignment”	   are	   both	   used	  to	   show	   strategic	   changes	   in	  market	   position.	   However	  these	   two	   words	   are	   quite	  different	   in	   terms	   of	   the	  nuance	  of	   “Path	  dependence”,	  which	  has	  a	  significant	  meaning	   in	   this	  research.	  The	   word	   “Repositioning”	   emphasizes	   the	   nuance	   of	   changing	   position	   to	  somewhere	  they	  want	  to	  move	  into,	  while	  “Realignment”	  emphasizes	  the	  nuance	  of	  changing	  direction	  based	  on	  its	  previous	  activities.	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What	  was	  confirmed	  through	  the	  examination	  was	  that	  firms	  changed	  direction	  of	   strategies	  not	   into	  somewhere	  very	  deviated	   from	   its	  previous	  activities	  but	  into	  somewhere	  they	  could	  utilize	  its	  core	  strength.	  The	  word	  “Realignment”	  will	  be	   therefore	   considered	   as	   more	   appropriate	   word	   to	   express	   the	   nuance	   of	  “Path	  dependence”	  rather	  than	  “Repositioning”.	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Chapter	  5	  	  	  
Analysis	  of	  Shipbuilding	  Industry	  in	  The	  1970s	  Oil	  Crisis	  	  In	   this	   chapter,	   the	   final	   step	   to	  confirm	  whether	  or	  not	   the	  3R-­‐ACAP	  model	   is	  applicable	   to	   the	   shipbuilding	   industry	   is	   taken	   by	   examining	   Japan’s	   and	  European’s	  turnaround	  from	  the	  oil	  crisis	  in	  the	  1970s.	  The	  result	  will	  be	  in	  fact	  the	  conclusion	  of	  this	  entire	  research	  since	  the	  goal	  of	  this	  research	  is	  to	  find	  an	  applicable	  turnaround	  model	  for	  Japanese	  shipbuilding	  industry.	  	  	  
5-­‐1	  Analytical	  Method	  	  Analysis	  consists	  of	  two	  parts.	  In	  the	  first	  part,	  analysis	  of	  Japan	  in	  the	  oil	  crisis	  will	  be	  done	  in	  order	  to	  confirm	  the	  feasibility	  of	  the	  3R-­‐ACAP	  model.	  Feasibility	  is	   confirmed	   by	   identifying	   the	   eight	   factors	   for	   turnaround	   (Internal	   sources,	  External	   sources	   Triggers,	   Potential	   ACAP,	   Realized	   ACAP,	   Retrenchment,	  Reorganization,	   and	   Realignment)	   as	   well	   as	   the	   three	   industries	   analyzed	   in	  chapter	  4.	  	  	  In	  the	  second	  part,	  analysis	  of	  Europeans	  in	  the	  oil	  crisis	  will	  be	  done	  in	  the	  same	  method.	   However,	   the	   purpose	   here	   is	   not	   only	   to	   confirm	   feasibility	   of	   the	  model	  but	  also	   to	   find	  practical	   lessons	   from	  the	  Europeans.	   It	  was	  considered	  that	   strategies	   taken	   by	   previous	   leaders	   in	   the	   past	   could	   provide	   lessons	   to	  Japanese	  shipbuilders	  in	  current	  crisis.	  	  
5-­‐2	  Japan	  and	  Europe	  in	  The	  1970s	  Oil	  Crisis	  	  
5-­‐2-­‐1	  Japan	  After	  The	  Oil	  Crisis	  
	  Development	  of	  the	  world’s	  economy	  with	  abundant	  energy	  sources	  ended	  with	  the	  oil	   crisis	   in	  1973.	   It	  had	  a	  serious	   impact	  especially	   to	  developed	  countries	  consuming	  huge	   amount	   of	   oil	   to	  maintain	   its	   economic	   activities.	  At	   the	   time,	  Japan’s	  market	   share	   in	  oil	   tankers	   and	  bulk	   carriers	  market	  dropped	   from	  54	  percent	   in	   1975	   to	   27	   percent	   in	   1978.	   However,	   after	   Japan	   experienced	   a	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serious	  decline,	  it	  achieved	  a	  remarkable	  recovery	  in	  market	  share	  recovering	  up	  to	  45	  percent	  in	  1979,	  and	  to	  65	  percent	  in	  1980.	  	  
	  











(Million GT/ %) 
1975 3,043 1,640 53.8 998 32.7 
1976 2,442 1,200 49.1 828 33.9 
1977 1,602 664 41.4 566 35.3 
1978 733 201 27.4 223 30.4 
1979 537 242 45.0 103 19.1 
1980 860 557 64.7 81 9.4 
1981 1235 734 59.4 136 11.0 
Source:  
Shipbuilding statistics handbook (The Ministry of Transport) 	  In	  this	  part,	  a	  book	  titled	  (Originally	  written	  in	  Japanese)	  “How	  long	  could	  Japan	  secure	   its	   position	   as	   the	   world’s	   No.1	   shipbuilding	   country?”	   written	   by	  Hiroyuki	   Itami	   (1992)	  was	   studied	   in	  order	   to	   identify	   the	  eight	   factors	  by	   the	  3R-­‐ACAP	  model.	  	  
Table	  5.2	  -­‐	  The	  Eight	  Factors	  in	  Japanese	  Shipbuilding	  Industry	  after	  the	  oil	  
crisis	  in	  1970s	  
	  
The Eight factors 
 




Ability cumulated by building high quality, low cost, and energy 
saving ships 
Ability cumulated by adopting itself to environmental change 
including currency rate change (strong yen) and steel price 
change (rise in price) by cost saving 
External 
Sources 
Network created by development of related industries 
Abundant human resources from Universities 
Synergic growth lead by domestic competitors 
Trigger The oil crisis in 1973 and 1979 
ACAP 
Potential ACAP 
What was the valuable information assimilated? 
Government’s announcement of “Curtailment of Production 
(work time)” in 1976 
Government’s announcement of “Curtailment of Production 
(facility)” in 1978 
Emerged demand for energy saving ships after the crisis 
Realized ACAP 
How they understood the information and used it? 
Big firms 
 
Diversification to offshore and onshore 
products 
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Middle & Small 
firms 





Reduction in number of major shipbuilders from 44 to 26 
Canceled investment, reduced number of subcontractors, 
ceased new employment, and called for voluntary retirement 
Reorganization 
Reinforced other business and allocated workers there 
(Reorganized business portfolio) 
Reorganization of major shipbuilding groups 
(Reduced from 21 groups to 8 groups) 
Realignment 
Big firms Realignment towards comprehensive 
heavy industry with broader businesses 
All firms Realignment by differentiation Source:	   Identified	  by	  using	   the	  3R-­‐ACAP	  model	   from	  “How	   long	  could	   Japan	  secure	   its	  position	  as	  the	  world’s	  No.1	  shipbuilding	  country?”	  written	  by	  Hiroyuki	  Itami	  (1992)	  	  
Sources	  (Internal	  &	  external)	  and	  triggers	  Japan’s	   internal	   sources	   identified	   here	   was	   its	   knowledge	   and	   experience	  accumulated	   from	   its	   beginning	   as	   a	   traditional	   Navy.	   	   Sources	   accumulated	  enabled	  them	  to	  develop	  high	  quality,	  low	  cost,	  and	  energy	  saving	  ships.	  Ability	  to	  adopt	  itself	  to	  changing	  environment	  such	  as	  currency	  rate	  and	  steel	  price	  was	  also	  an	  important	  skill	  they	  acquired	  through	  its	  experiences.	  For	  example,	  Japan	  experienced	  sudden	  change	  toward	  strong	  Yen	  and	  sudden	  rise	  in	  steel	  price	  in	  the	  1950s	  and	  it	  overcame	  the	  crisis	  by	  cost	  saving	  efforts.	  	  Itami	   (1992,	   page	   58)	   mentions	   that	   technologies	   and	   experiences	   cumulated	  during	   the	   wartime	   construction	   greatly	   contributed	   when	   they	   started	  producing	   tankers	   and	   bulk	   carriers	   in	   the	   post	   war	   era.	   As	   they	   already	   had	  technologies,	  major	  hurdle	  was	  to	  lower	  the	  cost	  for	  commercial	  productions.	  All	  of	   the	   knowledge	   and	   experience	   cumulated	   here	   contributed	   as	   its	   internal	  sources	  to	  turnaround	  from	  the	  oil	  crisis	  later.	  	  There	   are	   three	  major	   external	   sources	   identified	   here,	   which	   provided	   Japan	  with	   competitive	   advantages.	   At	   first,	   development	   of	   related	   industries	  provided	  Japan	  with	  synergy	  effect	  to	  grow.	  According	  to	  Itami	  (1992,	  page	  8),	  it	  was	   the	   steel	   industry	   at	   the	   beginning	   and	   later	   engines	   and	   other	   marine	  machinery	  suppliers	  that	  provided	  synergy	  effect	  to	  the	  shipbuilding	   industry’s	  growth.	   And	   second,	   abundant	   human	   resources	   from	   Universities	   provided	  Japan	  competitive	  advantage	  with	  abundant	  skilled	  engineers.	  At	  the	  time,	  eight	  National	   Universities	   had	   shipbuilding	   divisions	   because	   fostering	   the	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shipbuilding	   industry	   was	   the	   Governments’	   policy	   at	   the	   time.	   And	   third,	  numbers	   of	   competitors	   in	   the	   domestic	   market,	   gave	   strong	   motivation	   to	  shipbuilders	  for	  technological	  innovations	  even	  after	  it	  became	  the	  world’s	  No.1.	  And	  finally,	  what	  triggered	  it	  was	  the	  oil	  crisis	  in	  1973	  and	  1979,	  which	  was	  the	  end	  of	  the	  world’s	  economic	  growth	  lead	  by	  abundant	  energy	  resources.	  	  
PACAP	  and	  RACAP	  Although	  there	  are	  clear	  definition	  by	  Zahra	  and	  George	  regarding	  the	  two	  types	  of	   ACAP,	   it	  was	   redefined	   here	   that	   PACAP	   stands	   for	   “What	  was	   the	   valuable	  information	   they	   got”	   and	   RACAP	   stands	   for	   “How	   they	   understood	   the	  information	   and	   used	   it”	   in	   order	   to	   make	   the	   two	   ACAPs	   more	   visible	   in	  practical	  cases.	  	  In	  Japan,	  there	  were	  three	  important	  information	  accumulated	  by	  the	  PACAP.	  At	  first,	   the	   Government’s	   announcement	   of	   “Curtailment	   of	   Production	   (work-­‐time)”	  in	  November	  1976.	  Curtail	  of	  production	  based	  on	  reduction	  in	  work-­‐time	  was	   announced	   for	  big	   firms	   to	   reduce	   to	   its	   67	  percent	   level,	  middle	   firms	   to	  reduce	  to	   its	  76	  percent	   level,	  and	  small	   firms	  to	  reduce	  to	   its	  82	  percent	   level	  from	   its	  peak.	  And	  second,	   the	  Government’s	  announcement	  of	   “Curtailment	  of	  Production	   (facility)”	   in	   1978.	   Curtail	   of	   production	   based	   on	   reduction	   in	  building	  facility	  (in	  total	  tonnage)	  was	  announced	  to	  61	  major	  shipyards	  in	  Japan	  including	  7	  big	  firms,	  17	  middle	  firms,	  and	  16	  small	  firms.	  Announcement	  was	  to	  reduce	  40	  percent	  of	  building	  facility	  for	  big	  firms,	  30	  percent	  for	  middle	  firms,	  and	  27	  percent	   for	  small	   firms.	  And	  third,	   it	  was	  the	  demand	  for	  energy	  saving	  ships	   after	   the	   oil	   crisis.	   Due	   to	   sudden	   rise	   in	   crude	   oils	   price,	   demand	   for	  energy	  saving	  ships	  rose	  sharply.	  	  What	   is	   interesting	   in	   Japan’s	   case	   is	   although	   they	   assimilated	   similar	  information	   (PACAP),	   how	   they	  understood	  and	  used	   it	   (RACAP)	  was	  different	  among	   firms	   depending	   on	   its	   size.	   Big	   firms	   mainly	   diversified	   into	   other	  offshore	  products	  or	  onshore	  products,	  while	  small	  and	  middle	  shipyards	  started	  building	   smaller	   ships	   than	   before.	   Due	   to	   Governments	   unequal	   measures	   to	  give	   big	   firms	   with	   heavier	   burden	   and	   smaller	   firms	   with	   lighter	   burden	   to	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reduce	   building	   capacity,	   strategies	   taken	   by	   firms	   differed	   by	   its	   size.	   It	   was	  natural	  for	  big	  firms	  to	  move	  into	  other	  non-­‐shipbuilding	  products	  while	  it	  was	  more	  efficient	  for	  small	  firms	  to	  build	  smaller	  ships	  up	  to	  its	  limit.	  And	  also	  the	  oil	   crisis	   requiring	   energy	   saving	   ships	   and	   trend	   of	   downsizing	   also	   pushed	  small	  and	  medium	  shipyards	  to	  build	  smaller	  ships.	  	  	  
3R	  (Retrenchment	  /	  Reorganization	  /	  Realignment)	  The	  major	  retrenchment	  in	  whole	  Japanese	  shipbuilding	  industry	  was	  reduction	  in	  number	  of	  shipbuilders.	  Number	  of	  major	  shipbuilders	  decreased	  from	  44	  to	  26	  during	   this	   period.	  As	   for	   individuals	   firms,	   numbers	   of	   shipyards	   canceled	  investment	   plans,	   reduced	   number	   of	   subcontractors,	   ceased	   new	   employees,	  and	  called	  for	  voluntary	  retirement,	  which	  was	  all	  retrenchment.	  	  For	   example,	   subcontractors	   amounted	   43,016	   persons	   in	   1974	   dropped	   to	  25,127	  in	  1976.	  Average	  of	  total	  new	  employees	  in	  major	  shipyards	  during	  1971	  to	   1974	  was	   approximately	   6,700	   to	   10,000	   persons	   per	   year	   but	   it	   suddenly	  dropped	  to	  zero	  in	  1976.	  Voluntary	  retirement	  was	  especially	  seen	  in	  small	  and	  middle	  shipyards	  since	  it	  was	  not	  possible	  to	  reallocate	  excess	  workers	  to	  other	  divisions	  due	  to	  narrower	  business	  portfolio	  compared	  with	  big	  shipyards.	  	  Reorganization	   of	   business	   portfolio	   by	   allocating	   excess	   workers	   to	   on-­‐shore	  divisions	   was	   done	   especially	   by	   big	   firms	   having	   broader	   business	   portfolio.	  According	  to	  Itami	  (1992),	  the	  share	  of	  shipbuilding	  division	  within	  the	  company	  dropped	   to	   almost	   half	   between	   1975	   and	   1981.	   For	   example,	   shipbuilding	  division’s	   share	   in	   Mitsubishi	   dropped	   from	   41	   percent	   to	   21	   percent,	   IHI	  dropped	   from	  41	  percent	   to	  25	  percent,	  Kawasaki	  dropped	   from	  28	  percent	   to	  20	  percent,	  Hitachi	  dropped	  form	  70	  percent	  to	  35	  percent,	  and	  Mitsui	  dropped	  from	  74	  percent	  to	  35	  percent	  during	  this	  period.	  Reorganization	  of	  shipbuilders’	  group	   was	   also	   identified	   during	   this	   period.	   Groups	   of	   shipbuilders,	   which	  originally	  comprised	  of	  21	  groups	  finally	  decreased	  to	  8	  groups	  by	  shrink	  of	  the	  Japanese	  shipbuilding	  market.	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There	  were	  mainly	  two	  types	  of	  realignment	  in	  Japan’s	  1970s.	  The	  first	  type	  was	  realignment	  toward	  comprehensive	  heavy	  industry	  with	  broader	  product	  menus	  and	  business	  portfolios,	  which	  was	  mainly	   taken	  by	  big	   firms.	  The	  second	  type	  was	   realignment	   of	   strategies	   by	   differentiation.	   Shipyards	   differentiated	  themselves	  by	  developing	  smaller	  ships	  equipped	  with	  advanced	  energy	  saving	  technologies.	  The	  second	  type,	  which	  was	  associated	  with	  lower	  risk	  was	  taken	  by	  all	  firms	  especially	  by	  small	  and	  middle	  shipyards.	  
	  
5-­‐2-­‐2	  Europe	  After	  The	  Oil	  Crisis	  	  In	   this	   part,	   the	   same	   book	   titled	   (Originally	   written	   in	   Japanese)	   “How	   long	  could	   Japan	   secure	   its	   position	   as	   the	   world’s	   No.1	   shipbuilding	   country?”	  written	   by	   Hiroyuki	   Itami	   (1992)	   was	   studied	   in	   order	   to	   identify	   the	   eight	  factors	  from	  the	  fact.	  	  For	  the	  Europeans,	  initial	  impact	  of	  the	  1970s	  oil	  crisis	  was	  not	  as	  big	  as	  Japan.	  Europeans	  were	  less	  affected	  by	  the	  crisis	  because	  they	  already	  started	  moving	  into	   sophisticated	   ships	   such	   as	   LNG	   and	   LPG	   carriers.	   It	   was	   to	   avoid	   direct	  competition	   with	   Japan	   in	   oil	   tankers	   and	   bulk	   carriers	   market.	   According	   to	  Itami	   (1992),	   Europeans	   had	   been	   utilizing	   LNG	   and	   LPG	   as	   a	   popular	   energy	  sources	   in	   its	   history	   and	   therefore	   demand	   for	   sea	   transportation	  within	   the	  region	  existed.	  	  Although	  both	  Japan	  and	  Europeans	  achieved	  turnaround	  from	  the	  oil	  crisis,	  the	  basic	  concepts	  applied	  for	  turnaround	  was	  quite	  different.	  For	  example,	  Japan’s	  turnaround	  was	  achieved	  without	  fundamental	  change	  in	  strategic	  direction.	  For	  example,	   Japan’s	   market	   share	   in	   oil	   tankers	   and	   bulk	   carriers	   market	   once	  dropped	   by	   the	   crisis	   but	   it	   even	   increased	   later,	   which	  means	   they	   have	   not	  changed	  fundamental	  strategies.	  In	  case	  of	  Europeans,	  it	  concentrated	  more	  into	  sophisticated	   ships	   and	   also	   started	   diversifying	   into	   other	   energy	   related	  products.	   As	   a	   result,	   Europeans	  market	   share	   in	   oil	   tankers	   and	  bulk	   carriers	  dropped	   to	   one	   third	   of	   the	   level	   before	   the	   crisis.	   Europeans	   turnaround	  was	  therefore	  achieved	  by	  bigger	  change	  in	  direction	  compared	  with	  Japan.	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Table	  5.3	   -­‐	  The	  Eight	  Factors	   in	  European	  Shipbuilding	   Industry	  after	   the	  
oil	  crisis	  in	  1970s	  
	  
The Eight factors 
 









Transnational network of shipbuilders and marine suppliers 
 
Trigger 
The oil crisis in 1973 and 1979 




What was the valuable information assimilated? 
Nationalization of shipyards in European region 
Development in North sea oil 
 
Realized ACAP 
How they understood the information and used it? 
To build more sophisticated ships 
Diversify into new areas such as offshore products 
 
3R 
Retrenchment Retrenchment in building capacity and workforce 
Reorganization Reinforced other business and allocated workers there (Reorganized business portfolio) 
Realignment 
Realignment of business model from project leader to vendor 
of parts (from shipbuilder to supplier of parts in other industry) 
Realignment towards specialized or differentiated shipbuilder 
 Source:	   Identified	  by	  using	   the	  3R-­‐ACAP	  model	   from	  “How	   long	  could	   Japan	  secure	   its	  position	  as	  the	  world’s	  No.1	  shipbuilding	  country?”	  written	  by	  Hiroyuki	  Itami	  (1992)	  
	  
Sources	  (Internal	  &	  external)	  and	  triggers	  Its	  knowledge	  and	  experience	  accumulated	  in	  its	  history	  to	  produce	  value	  added	  ships	  were	  identified	  as	  the	  Europeans	  internal	  sources.	  Japan’s	  growth	  as	  a	  low	  cost	  leader	  in	  the	  1950s	  made	  Europeans	  to	  move	  toward	  further	  sophisticated	  ships	  with	  higher	  value	  to	  avoid	  direct	  competition	  with	  Japan.	  	  	  Transnational	   network	   among	   European	   shipyards	   and	   various	   suppliers	  producing	  engines	  and	  marine	  equipment	  was	  identified	  as	  its	  external	  sources.	  External	   network	   enabled	   European	   shipbuilders	   to	   achieve	   low	   cost	   and	  advanced	   technology	   at	   once	   by	   producing	   onboard	  machineries	   in	   developed	  countries	  with	  high	  wages	  and	  building	  ships	   in	  developing	  countries	  with	   low	  wages.	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PACAP	  and	  RACAP	  In	   order	   to	   make	   the	   two	   ACAPs	   more	   visible	   in	   practical	   cases,	   Zahra	   and	  George’s	  definition	  of	  ACAP	  was	  redefined	  here	  that	  PACAP	  stands	  for	  “What	  was	  the	  valuable	  information	  they	  got”	  and	  RACAP	  stands	  for	  “How	  they	  understood	  the	  information	  and	  used	  it”.	  	  The	   major	   information	   accumulated	   by	   PACAP	   here	   was	   the	   European	  Governments	  intervention	  to	  nationalize	  shipyards	  within	  the	  European	  region.	  Through	  1978	  and	  1983,	  60	  percent	  of	  the	  shipyards	  in	  European	  countries	  were	  nationalized.	  Under	  the	  Governments’	  control,	  facilities,	  and	  workforce	  had	  been	  integrated	   to	   improve	   efficiently.	   Another	   valuable	   information	   for	   them	   was	  development	   in	   the	  North	  Sea	  Oil,	  which	  was	   focused	  after	   the	  oil	   crisis.	  These	  information	  were	  accumulated	  by	  Europeans’	  PACAP.	  	  How	   they	   understood	   and	   used	   these	   assimilated	   information	   (RACAP)	   are	  categorized	  mainly	  into	  two	  types.	  The	  first	  type	  is	  to	  specialize	  or	  differentiate	  themselves	   in	   the	   market	   by	   building	   ships	   with	   more	   value.	   Although	   ships	  produced	   in	   Europe	   at	   the	   time	   was	   already	   highly	   sophisticated,	   many	  shipyards	   were	   still	   building	   tankers	   and	   bulk	   carriers.	   However,	   in	   those	  segments,	   they	   were	   forced	   to	   compete	   directly	   with	   developing	   countries.	  Number	  of	   shipyards	   therefore	   ceased	  production	  of	   tankers	   and	  bulk	   carriers	  and	  started	  producing	  more	  sophisticated	  ships.	  The	  second	  type	  is	  to	  diversify	  into	  new	  areas	   such	  as	  offshore	  products	   including	  oil	  drilling	   rigs	  and	  related	  workboats.	   Numbers	   of	   Norwegian	   shipyards,	   which	   previously	   ranked	   in	   the	  world’s	   number	   five	   or	   six	   in	   tankers	   segment	  moved	   into	   offshore	   oil	   drilling	  rigs	  and	  related	  workboats.	  	  
3R	  (Retrenchment	  /	  Reorganization	  /	  Realignment)	  Retrenchment	  in	  building	  capacity	  was	  the	  main	  retrenchment	  of	  Europeans.	  For	  example,	   Sweden,	   which	   was	   once	   the	   No.1	   shipbuilder	   in	   Europe	   reduced	  building	   capacity	  by	  20	  percent	   in	  1978,	   and	  50	  percent	   in	  1980.	  Holland	  also	  reduced	  its	  building	  capacity	  to	  70	  percent	  of	  its	  1975	  level	  in	  1977.	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There	   are	   two	   kinds	   of	   reorganizations	   identified.	   The	   first	   one	   is	   to	  reorganization	   of	   facilities	   and	   workforce	   to	   improve	   product	   efficiency.	   The	  second	   one	   is	   to	   reorganize	   business	   portfolios.	   In	   order	   to	   stable	   the	  shipbuilding	   business	   that	   was	   in	   crisis,	   other	   businesses	   were	   reinforced	   by	  reorganization.	  	  Realignment	   for	   Europeans	   was	   mainly	   diversification	   into	   other	   offshore	  products,	   energy	   related	   businesses,	   and	   further	   specialization	   to	   build	   more	  sophisticated	  ships.	  As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  Europeans	  had	  been	   less	  affected	  by	  the	  crisis	  compared	  with	  Japan.	  It	  was	  because	  they	  were	  building	  LPG	  and	  LNG	  carriers	   that	   are	   more	   sophisticated.	   However,	   since	   competitors	   gradually	  followed	  the	  same	  strategy,	  Europeans	  had	  to	  move	  into	  further	  advanced	  stage.	  Many	  shipyards	  moved	   into	  offshore	  products,	   specialized	  ships	   such	  as	   cruise	  ships	  and	  other	  special	  purpose	  ships.	  Shipyards	  in	  Germany	  went	  into	  windmill	  products	   for	   which	   they	   could	   not	   take	   the	   whole	   project	   but	   could	   join	   the	  project	   as	   a	   supplier	   of	   the	   body	   of	   windmill	   generators.	   Germany’s	   case	   is	   a	  change	  of	  business	  model	  from	  being	  a	  project	  leader	  of	  whole	  product	  towards	  a	  vendor	  of	  parts.	  	  	  
5-­‐3	  Result	  
	  
Feasibility	  of	  the	  3R-­‐ACAP	  model	  Evidence	   of	   the	   Japanese	   and	  European	   shipbuilding	   industry	   in	   the	   1970s	   oil	  crisis	  confirms	  feasibility	  of	  the	  3R-­‐ACAP	  model.	  The	  model	  worked	  properly	  to	  identify	   the	   eight	   factors	   related	   to	   the	   turnaround	  of	   shipbuilding	   industry	   in	  both	   Japan	   and	   Europe.	   The	   model	   also	   shows	   the	   process	   of	   how	   they	  assimilated	   and	   utilized	   valuable	   information	   to	   create	   turnaround	   strategies.	  Since	   the	   goal	   of	   this	   research	   is	   to	   find	   an	   applicable	   turnaround	   model	   for	  Japanese	   shipbuilding	   industry,	   now	   it	   comes	   to	   conclusion	   that	   the	   3R-­‐ACAP	  model	  is	  the	  applicable	  turnaround	  model	  for	  them.	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Further	  analysis	  of	  results	  In	  the	  meantime,	  further	  analysis	  to	  identify	  the	  basic	  concepts	  and	  strategies	  is	  done	  and	  summarized	  in	  Figure	  5.1.	  This	  figure	  is	  derived	  from	  the	  result	  of	  3R-­‐ACAP	   model	   analysis	   (Table	   5.2	   and	   Table	   5.3)	   by	   focusing	   on	   its	   strategic	  aspects.	  The	  two	  keywords	  for	  strategies	  (“Recovery”	  and	  “Renewal”)	  came	  from	  the	   “Six	   stages”	   of	   turnaround	   process	   discovered	   by	   Peter	   Mckiernan	   (The	  Oxford	  Handbook	  of	  STRATEGY	  Chapter	  27).	  	  
Concept	  and	  strategy	  The	   two	   keywords	   comprising	   Japan’s	   basic	   concept	   are	   “Retrenchment”	   and	  “Product	   oriented”	   move.	   	   It	   includes	   retrenchment	   in	   scale	   followed	   by	  strategies	   focusing	   on	   “Products”.	   The	   conceptual	   keywords	   for	   Europeans	   are	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  “Retrenchment”	  and	  “Dual	  moves”.	   	  It	  includes	  retrenchment	  in	  scale	  followed	  by	  strategies	  focusing	  on	  both	  “Product”	  and	  “Market”	  oriented	  moves.	  An	   interesting	   finding	  here	   is	   that	  both	   Japan	  and	  Europeans	  had	  been	  considering	  advanced	  key	  technologies	  as	  its	  core	  competencies	  but	  while	  Japan	  utilized	   it	  mainly	   for	   “Product”	   oriented	  moves,	   Europeans	   utilized	   it	   for	   both	  “Product”	  and	  “Market”	  oriented	  moves.	  	  	  Figure	   5.1	   also	   shows	   the	   basic	   strategies	   for	   subsequent	   “Recovery”	   and	  “Renewal	   stages	   based	   on	   the	   above	   mentioned	   concepts.	   In	   case	   of	   Japan,	   it	  created	  broader	  product	  and	  business	  portfolio	   to	   “Stabilize	   the	   foundation”	  of	  business.	  It	  also	  differentiated	  itself	  by	  developing	  further	  “Energy	  saving	  ships”.	  Development	  of	  energy	  saving	  technologies	  pursued	  by	  “Kaizen”	  skill	  of	  Japanese	  greatly	  contributed	  for	  differentiation.	  And	  what	  is	  common	  between	  Japan’s	  two	  strategies	  are	  “Product	  oriented”	  moves.	  	  In	  case	  of	  Europeans,	   further	  specialization	   in	  particular	  segments	  such	  as	  LPG	  ships,	   LNG	   ships,	   and	   cruise	   ships	   market	   was	   “Product	   oriented”	   moves.	  Diversification	   into	   “Energy	   related”	   businesses	   such	   as	   offshore	   drilling	   rigs,	  workboats,	  and	  windmill	  plants	  was	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  “Market	  oriented”	  moves.	  Difference	   between	   Japan	   and	   Europe	   was	   therefore	   the	   combination	   of	   two	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“Product”	  and	  “Market”	  oriented	  moves,	  while	  Japan	  had	  only	  “Product	  ornented”	  moves.	  	  
Figure	   5.1	   -­‐	   Concepts	   and	   strategies	   taken	   by	   Japan	   and	   Europe	   for	  
turnaround	  in	  the	  oil	  crisis	  
	  
	  Source:	  The	  Author’s	  original	  developed	  for	  this	  research	  	  
“Path	  dependence”	  and	  “Governments’	  intervention”	  What	   is	   common	   to	   both	   cases	   are	   at	   first,	   “Path	   dependence”	   associated	  with	  turnaround.	   The	   evidence	   shows	   that	   successful	   turnarounds	   are	   achieved	   by	  challenging	   something	   that	   are	   related	   to	   its	   strength,	   competencies	   or	   ability	  they	  have.	  Considering	  “Path	  dependence”	  is	  therefore	  inevitable	  while	  creating	  turnaround	  strategies.	  	  And	  next,	   the	  “Governments’	   intervention”	   is	  a	  common	  factor	  determining	   the	  basic	  concepts.	  In	  Japan,	  the	  Governments’	  intervention	  was	  mainly	  reduction	  in	  building	  capacity	  while	  in	  Europe	  it	  contained	  fundamental	  change	  in	  direction.	  In	  European	  countries,	  not	  only	  downsizing	  in	  scale	  but	  also	  change	  in	  direction	  toward	   more	   value	   added	   ships	   and	   other	   offshore	   products	   had	   been	  implemented.	  	  There	  are	  both	  positive	  and	  negative	  aspects	  while	  comparing	  the	  Governments	  measures	   in	  both	  cases.	  According	   to	   Itami	   (1992)	  unequal	  measures	   taken	  by	  the	   Japanese	   Government	   allocating	   heavier	   burden	   to	   big	   firms	   and	   lighter	  burden	  to	  small	  and	  middle	  firms	  weakened	  the	  basis	  of	  Japanese	  shipbuilding,	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which	  was	  a	  negative	  aspect.	  However,	  numbers	  of	  small	  and	  middle	  shipyards	  building	  tankers	  and	  bulk	  carriers	  enabled	  to	  survive	  and	  therefore,	  Japan’s	  total	  output	  in	  tonnage	  recovered	  sharply,	  which	  was	  a	  positive	  aspect.	  	  	  In	   case	  of	  Europeans,	   it	   succeeded	   to	   create	   further	   competitive	   advantages	   in	  particular	  market	  especially	  in	  LPG/LNG	  carriers	  and	  cruise	  ships,	  which	  was	  a	  positive	   aspect.	   However,	   many	   shipyards	   reduced	   production	   of	   tankers	   and	  bulk	   carriers	  and	   therefore	   its	   total	   tonnage	  output	  declined	   sharply.	  Although	  Governments	   interventions	   are	   unmanageable	   factors	   for	   individual	   firms,	  shipyards’	   ability	   to	   assimilate	   valuable	   information	   and	   to	   utilize	   it	   to	   create	  strategies	  is	  an	  important	  key	  for	  turnaround.	  	  
Potential	  effect	  of	  synergy	  Although	  it	  would	  require	  further	  research	  to	  find	  empirical	  evidences,	  it	  will	  be	  able	  to	  say	  that	  “Synergy	  effect”	  is	  a	  potential	  function	  increasing	  the	  outcome	  of	  strategies.	   For	   example,	   broader	  product	   and	  business	  portfolio	   could	  possibly	  provide	   synergy	   effect	   to	   R&D	   of	   energy	   saving	   technologies.	   Ship’s	   fuel	  consumption	   comprises	   of	   various	   factors	   including	   hull	   design,	   engines,	  generators	   and	   various	   onboard	   machineries.	   	   And	   therefore,	   feedbacks	   from	  related	   manufacturers	   within	   the	   group	   or	   outside	   the	   group	   could	   provide	  synergy	  effect	  for	  further	  development.	  	  	  In	  case	  of	  Europeans,	  further	  specialization	  in	  LPG	  &	  LNG	  carriers	  could	  possibly	  widened	   its	   network	   to	   support	   diversification	   into	   other	   energy	   related	  businesses.	   As	   a	   result,	   outcome	   became	   greater	   than	   the	   sum	   of	   individual	  strategies	  and	  therefore	  contributed	  to	  the	  turnaround.	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Chapter	  6	  
Analysis	   of	   Major	   Three	   Japanese	   Shipbuilders	   in	   the	   Current	  
Crisis	  	  In	   this	   chapter,	   further	   step	   to	   analyze	   Major	   Japanese	   shipbuilders	   in	   the	  current	   crisis	   is	   taken	  by	   the	  3R-­‐ACAP	  models	   analysis.	  Purpose	  of	   this	   step	   is	  not	   to	   confirm	   the	   feasibility	   of	   the	   model	   but	   to	   provide	   practical	  recommendations	  to	  the	  Japanese	  shipbuilders.	  	  
6-­‐1	  Analytical	  Method	  	  Analysis	  will	  be	  done	  at	  first	  by	  identifying	  as	  much	  as	  possible	  the	  eight	  factors	  for	   turnaround	   (Internal	   sources,	   External	   sources,	   Triggers,	   Potential	   ACAP,	  Realized	  ACAP,	  Retrenchment,	  Reorganization,	  and	  Realignment)	  as	  well	  as	   the	  analysis	   in	   previous	   chapters.	   It	   is	   to	   find	   evidences	   of	   the	   eight	   factors	   from	  various	  sources	  including	  industrial	  reports	  and	  web	  sites	  of	  the	  firms	  etc.	  	  However,	  results	  from	  the	  analysis	  are	  expected	  to	  be	  incomplete	  at	  the	  moment	  because	  shipyards	  are	  not	  yet	  affected	  by	  the	  crisis	  in	  real	  means.	  Shipyards	  are	  surviving	  by	  consuming	  its	  order	  backlogs	  until	  recent,	  which	  they	  served	  before	  the	   crisis	  with	   relatively	  good	  price.	  Although	   five	  years	  have	  passed	   since	   the	  beginning	   of	   economic	   crisis	   in	   2008,	   shipyards	   are	   still	   in	   the	   early	   stage	   of	  recession.	  They	  are	  currently	  struggling	  to	  find	  strategies	  to	  survive.	  	  In	  order	  to	  complement	  the	  strategies	  of	  firms	  that	  should	  be	  incomplete,	  lessons	  from	   the	   1970s	   oil	   crisis	   should	   be	   considered	   because	   of	   cumulativeness	   of	  sources.	  Lessons	  from	  the	  1970s	  crisis	  could	  help	  providing	  recommendations	  to	  shipyards	  in	  the	  current	  crisis.	  Beside	  cumulativeness	  of	  sources,	  considering	  the	  development	  path	  is	  an	  important	  point.	  It	  means	  that	  study	  from	  Europeans	  in	  the	  1970s	  could	  provide	  lessons	  to	  countries	  following	  similar	  development	  path	  in	   the	   future.	   Europeans	   were	   in	  more	   advanced	   stage	   of	   development	   at	   the	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time	   and	   therefore,	   study	   of	   previous	   leader’s	   strategies	   in	   the	   history	   could	  provide	  lessons	  to	  countries	  following	  similar	  development	  path.	  	  
6-­‐3	  The	  Three	  Major	  Shipyards	  	  In	   this	   part,	   three	   Japanese	   shipyards,	  Mitsubishi	  Heavy	   Industry	   (MHI),	   Japan	  Marine	   United	   (JMU),	   and	   Sasebo	   Heavy	   Industry	   (SSK)	   are	   chosen.	   MHI	   is	  chosen	  because	  it	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  historical	  shipyards	  representing	  Japan	  and	  has	   the	   broadest	   business	   portfolio.	   JMU	   is	   one	   of	   the	   largest	   shipbuilding	  company	  currently	  established	  by	  M&A	  of	  IHI	  Marine	  United	  and	  JFE.	  SSK	  is	  not	  as	  large	  as	  MHI	  and	  JMU	  but	  it	  has	  innovative	  corporate	  culture	  backed	  with	  the	  history	  started	  as	  traditional	  navy	  base.	  	  
Mitsubishi	  Heavy	  Industries,	  Ltd.	  (MHI)	  Mitsubishi	  was	  founded	  in	  1884	  and	  started	  shipbuilding	  in	  Nagasaki	  by	  leasing	  the	  shipyard	  from	  the	  Government.	  MHI	  is	  currently	  producing	  various	  products	  including	   aerospace	   components,	   air	   conditioners,	   aircraft,	   automobile	  components,	  forklift	  trucks,	  hydraulic	  equipment,	  machine	  tools,	  missiles,	  power	  generation	  equipment,	  ships,	  and	  space	  launch	  vehicles.	  MHI	  currently	  has	  four	  shipyards	   including	   Nagasaki	   shipyard,	   Kobe	   shipyard,	   Shimonoseki	   shipyard,	  and	   Yokohama	   shipyard.	   	   Its	   shipbuilding	   division	   produces	   various	   types	   of	  ships	   such	   as	   cruise	   ships,	   LNG	   carriers,	   LPG	   carriers,	   oil	   tankers,	   car	   carriers,	  battle	   ships,	   and	   submarines.	  MHI	   also	  has	   various	   group	   companies	   including	  Mitsubishi	   UFJ	   financial	   group,	   Mitsubishi	   motors,	   Mitsubishi	   atomic	   industry,	  Mitsubishi	   Chemical,	  Mitsubishi	   power	   systems,	   and	  Nikon	  Corporation.	   (Cited	  from	  MHI’s	  web	  site)	  	  
Japan	  Marine	  United	  Corporation	  (JMU)	  JMU	  was	  established	  by	  M&A	  of	  two	  shipbuilding	  companies,	  IHI	  Marine	  United	  and	  JFE	  Holdings,	  which	  was	  both	  major	  and	  historical.	  The	  history	  of	   JMU	  is	  a	  history	  of	  continuous	  M&A	  having	  four	  major	  shipbuilding	  companies	  in	  its	  roots.	  IHI,	   Sumitomo	   heavy	   industries,	   Hitachi	   shipyard,	   and	   JFE	   are	   the	   four	  shipbuilding	  companies	  comprising	  JMU.	  Its	  business	  consists	  of	  three	  divisions	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including	   “Merchant	   Ship	   and	   Offshore	   Division”	   building	   ships	   and	   offshore	  products,	  “Engineering	  Division”	  providing	  technology	  and	  engineering	  to	  other	  shipyards,	  and	  “Ship	  Life	  Cycle	  Division”	  providing	  repair	  work	  and	  conversion	  work	   including	   modifications	   related	   to	   energy	   saving	   and	   environmental	  regulation	  work.	  (Cited	  from	  JMU’s	  web	  site)	  	  
Sasebo	  Heavy	  Industries	  Co.,	  Ltd.	  (SSK)	  Sasebo	  heavy	   industries	   commonly	   called	   as	   “SSK”	   (Sasebo	  Senpaku	  Kogyo,	   its	  former	   name)	   was	   established	   in	   1946	   by	   purchasing	   shipyard	   and	   facilities	  from	  the	   traditional	  Sasebo	  navy	  base.	  Since	   the	   foundation,	  SSK	  has	  expanded	  its	  business	  from	  shipbuilding	  to	  various	  other	  fields.	  	  SSK	  currently	  comprise	  of	  four	  divisions	  including	  shipbuilding	  division,	  ship	  repairing	  division,	  machinery	  division,	  and	  steel	  structure	  division.	  Although	  SSK	  is	  not	  as	  big	  as	  MHI	  and	  JUM	  in	   size,	   its	   innovative	   corporate	   culture	   enabled	   SSK	   to	   produce	   the	   world’s	  largest	  crude	  oil	  carrier	  “Nisho	  Maru”	  (132,334	  DWT)	  in	  1962.	  SSK	  was	  also	  one	  of	  the	  two	  shipyards	  in	  Japan,	  which	  applied	  the	  “Arc	  welding”	  technology	  at	  the	  very	  beginning.	  (Cited	  from	  SSK’s	  web	  site)	  	  
Table	   6.1	   -­‐	   The	   Eight	   Factors	   in	   the	   three	   Japanese	   Shipyards	   after	   the	  
economic	  crisis	  in	  2008	  
	  
The Eight factors 
 





Ability cumulated by building high quality, low cost, and energy 
saving ships 
Ability cumulated by adopting itself to environmental change 
including currency rate change (strong yen) and steel price 
change (rise in price) by cost saving 
MHI and JMU 
Ability cumulated through building military ships 
SSK 





Network with JSDF and various suppliers 
MHI and JMU 
Network with group companies 
SSK 
Network with the U.S. Navy 
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Trigger 
ALL 
The economic crisis in 2008 
ACAP 
Potential ACAP 
What was the valuable information assimilated? 
ALL 
Severe price competition with developing countries that are not 
possible to overcome by efforts 
Emerging demand for energy saving ships 
Demand for diverse energy sources after the Tsunami 
MHI and JMU 
Inefficient allocation of facilities and workforces 
SSK 




How they understood the information and used it? 
MHI 
Closed one shipyard 
Emphasizing selling design instead of building ships 
JMU 
Merged with competitor and started building different ships in 
each shipyard 
SSK 





Ceased new investment 
Stopped hiring new employees 
Stopped rehiring senior employees 
MHI 
Sold its head office 
JMU 
Integrated its head office upon M&A 
SSK 
Sold its unutilized fixed assets 
Called for voluntary retirement 
 
Reorganization ALL 
Reorganization of business portfolio 
MHI 
Reinforcing engineering business and cruise ship business 
JMU 
Big organizational change by M&A 
Reorganization of product lines by increasing the menu 
SSK 
Reorganizing board directors 
 
Realignment MHI 




Trying to realign its position from middle-high end ship 
producer to high end ship producer 
SSK 
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Trying to realign its position from middle-high end ship 
producer to high end ship producer 
Trying to diversify into other businesses by realigning 
themselves from being a producer to vendor  
 
All : All of the three shipyards 
MHI : Mitsubishi Heavy Industry 
JMU : Japan Marine United 
SSK : Sasebo Heavy Industry 
 Source:	  Identified	  by	  using	  the	  3R-­‐ACAP	  model	  from	  “Japanese	  Shipbuilding	  Industry	  –	  How	   long	   could	   Japan	   secure	   its	   position	   as	   the	   world’s	   No.1	   shipbuilding	   country?”	  written	  by	  Hiroyuki	  Itami	  (1992)	  	  
Sources	  (Internal	  &	  external)	  and	  triggers	  As	   mentioned	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter	   analyzing	   Japan’s	   turnaround	   from	   the	  1970s	  oil	  crisis,	  technologies,	  knowledge,	  and	  experiences	  cumulated	  through	  its	  history	   until	   then	   became	   Japan’s	   internal	   sources	   to	   turnaround	   from	   the	   oil	  crisis.	   And	   now	   the	   same	   thing	   could	   be	   said	   here.	   Due	   to	   cumulativeness	   of	  sources,	   various	   technologies,	   knowledge,	   and	   experiences	   cumulated	   until	  current	  are	  the	  common	  internal	  sources	  not	  only	  for	  the	  three	  major	  shipyards	  but	  also	  for	  other	  Japanese	  shipyards.	  	  In	   addition	   to	   the	   common	   internal	   sources,	   firm	   specific	   sources	   are	   also	  identified.	  MHI	  and	  JMU	  have	  internal	  sources	  cumulated	  through	  new	  building	  and	  repair	  of	  military	  ships	  for	  Japan	  Self	  Defense	  Force	  (JSDF).	  MHI	  is	  one	  of	  the	  rare	  shipyards,	  which	  has	  technologies	  to	  build	  Submarines.	   	   JMU	  is	  also	  a	  rare	  shipyard	   that	   could	   build	   Aegis	   ships.	   SSK	   has	   internal	   sources	   cumulated	  through	   repair	   of	  military	   ships	   since	   its	   background	   is	   a	   traditional	   Japanese	  Navy	  Base.	  SSK	  has	  repair	  business	  with	  both	  JSDF	  and	  U.S.	  Navy.	  Sources	  among	  the	   three	   major	   shipyards	   are	   similar	   in	   terms	   of	   its	   relation	   with	   military	  business	   but	   its	   core	   competence	   and	   specialized	   area	   is	   quite	   different	   and	  comprising	  firm	  specific	  sources.	  	  Common	  external	  sources	  for	  the	  three	  firms	  are	  its	  network	  with	  JSDF	  including	  relation	  with	  various	  suppliers	  of	  onboard	  machineries.	  As	  for	   individual	   firms,	  MHI	   and	   JMU	   have	   various	   group	   companies	   producing	   onboard	  machineries.	  For	  example,	  MHI	  has	  a	  group	  company	  producing	  main	  engines	  and	  JMU	  has	  a	  group	  company	  producing	  turbo	  chargers.	  External	  network,	  which	  is	  specific	  to	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SSK	   is	   the	  relation	  with	  U.S.	  Navy.	  SSK	  has	  network	  with	  the	  U.S.	  Navy,	  various	  suppliers	   and	   subcontractors	   since	   it	   is	   neighboring	   to	   the	   Navy	   base	   and	   is	  working	  closely	  with	  them.	  And	  finally,	  what	  is	  triggering	  it	  is	  the	  economic	  crisis	  since	   2008,	  which	   caused	   the	   decline	   in	  worlds	   economy	   and	   recession	   of	   the	  shipbuilding	  industry.	  	  
PACAP	  and	  RACAP	  There	  are	  mainly	  three	  information,	  which	  is	  assimilated	  by	  the	  PACAP.	  At	  first,	  severe	  price	  competition,	  which	  is	  not	  able	  to	  overcome	  by	  firm’s	  effort.	  Due	  to	  overcapacity	   and	   severe	   price	   competition	   with	   developing	   countries,	   most	  Japanese	  shipyards	  are	  not	  even	  able	  to	  cover	  its	  cost.	  The	  second	  is	  an	  emerging	  demand	   for	   energy	   saving	   ships.	   Ship	   owners	   and	   operators	   are	   seeking	   for	  energy	  saving	  ships	   to	  save	   its	  operation	  cost.	  The	   third	   information	   is	  diverse	  needs	   for	   energy	   resources	   after	   the	   Tsunami.	   After	   the	   Tsunami	   disaster	   and	  explosion	   of	   Fukushima’s	   nuclear	   plant,	   increasing	   demand	   not	   only	   for	  substitute	  energy	  sources	  but	  also	  for	  renewable	  energy	  sources	  existed.	  	  In	   addition	   to	   these	   three	   common	   PACAP,	   firm	   specific	   PACAP	   are	   identified.	  MHI	   and	   JMU	   found	   that	   they	   are	   having	   several	   shipyards	   and	   workshops	  producing	  similar	  products,	  which	   is	  not	  efficient.	  SSK	  realized	   its	  geographical	  advantage	  that	  is	  rarely	  attacked	  by	  earthquakes.	  After	  the	  Fukushima	  disaster,	  Kyushu	  Island	  is	  highlighted	  as	  a	  place	  not	  only	  to	  relocate	  workshops	  of	  various	  manufacturing	  industries	  but	  also	  a	  place	  to	  build	  renewable	  energy	  plants.	  	  Followings	  are	  RACAP,	  which	  means	  how	  they	  understood	  and	  used	  information	  assimilated	  by	  PACAP.	  MHI	  and	  JMU	  in	  fact	  assimilated	  similar	  information	  (have	  several	  shipyards	  producing	  similar	  products)	  but	  the	  how	  they	  understood	  and	  used	   it	   was	   different.	   MHI	   closed	   some	   shipyards	   to	   improve	   efficiency	   and	  started	   selling	   designs	   to	   competitors	   instead	   of	   securing	   it.	   	   Because	   MHI	  realized	   that	   they	   could	   not	   compete	   with	   developing	   countries	   without	  changing	  its	  business	  model.	  This	  is	  an	  entrepreneurial	  decision	  changing	  from	  a	  manufacturing	  to	  engineering.	  What	  IHI	  and	  Universal	  shipyard	  decided	  to	  do	  is	  to	  merge	  with	  competitor	  and	   to	   start	  building	  different	   types	  of	   ships	   in	  each	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shipyard.	   This	   will	   be	   an	   efficiency	   improvement	   move	   by	   integrating	  organizations	   and	   facilities.	  What	   SSK	   is	   preparing	   to	   do	   is	   diversification	   into	  offshore	  windmill	  plants	  by	  utilizing	  its	  advanced	  technologies	  and	  geographical	  advantages	  located	  in	  Kyushu	  area.	  	  
3R	  (Retrenchment	  /	  Reorganization	  /	  Realignment)	  There	  are	  mainly	  three	  common	  retrenchments	  taken	  by	  the	  three	  shipyards.	  At	  first,	   it	   ceased	   new	   investment	   in	   order	   to	   save	   costs	   and	   second,	   it	   stopped	  hiring	   new	   employees	   and	   third,	   it	   stopped	   reemploying	   senior	   workers.	   In	  addition	  to	   these	  common	  retrenchments,	  MHI	  adopted	  3D	  design	  software	   for	  its	  design	  department	  to	  save	  cost	  such	  as	  fabrication	  costs	  for	  mock-­‐up	  models	  etc.	   MHI	   closed	   its	   Kobe	   shipyard,	   which	   had	   been	   allocated	   for	   commercial	  shipbuilding	   for	  a	   long	   time	  and	  reallocated	   it	   for	   submarines	  production.	  MHI	  also	  sold	   its	  head	  office	  and	  changed	  to	   lease	  contract	  as	  a	  retrenchment.	  Head	  office	  of	   IHI	  and	   JFE	  was	   integrated	  when	   they	  merged.	   SSK	  sold	   its	  unutilized	  fixed	   assets	   as	   retrenchment,	   and	   also	   called	   for	   voluntary	   retirement	   in	  September	  2013	  amounting	  for	  25	  percent	  of	  its	  whole	  employees.	  	  	  Reorganization	   commonly	   taken	   by	   the	   three	   firms	   is	   reallocation	   of	   workers	  from	   shipbuilding	   to	   other	   departments	   in	   order	   to	   reorganize	   business	  portfolios.	  As	  for	  individual	  firms,	  MHI	  is	  reinforcing	  its	  engineering	  business	  to	  provide	   technical	   support	   not	   only	   to	   domestic	   competitors	   but	   also	   to	  developing	  countries.	  MHI	  are	  also	  reinforcing	  its	  cruise	  ship	  business	  and	  at	  the	  same	   time,	   they	  are	  withdrawing	   from	  some	   types	  of	   commercial	   ships	  having	  relatively	  low	  value.	  	  	  JMU	  not	  only	  had	  an	  organizational	  change	  by	  M&A	  but	  also	  had	  reorganization	  of	   product	   menus.	   Mishima,	   the	   CEO	   of	   JMU	   mentioned	   in	   an	   interview	   that	  increase	  in	  menus	  of	  products	  to	  respond	  with	  various	  needs	  in	  the	  market	  was	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  effect	  expected	  by	  the	  M&A.	  As	  a	  result,	  JMU	  currently	  has	  various	  designs	  including	  tankers,	  bulk	  carriers,	  and	  container	  carriers.	  SSK	  is	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  reorganizing	  members	  of	  its	  board	  directors	  by	  appointing	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directors	   from	  outside	   in	  order	   to	  get	  broader	  view,	  which	   is	  an	  advantage	   for	  reinforcing	  external	  network	  for	  turnaround.	  	  The	  major	  realignment	  by	  MHI	  was	  a	  strategic	  change	  from	  securing	  technology	  to	  selling	  technology.	  MHI	  started	  selling	  designs	  to	  competitors	  not	  only	  in	  the	  domestic	  market	   but	   also	   in	   developing	   countries.	   JMU	   is	   trying	   to	   realign	   its	  market	   position	   to	   more	   sophisticated	   ships	   by	   developing	   energy	   saving	  technlogies.	  Mishima	  of	   JMU	  says	   that	   they	  are	  seeking	   for	  high-­‐end	  users	  who	  could	  buy	  ships	   from	  Japanese	  even	   the	  price	  are	  high.	  For	  example,	   the	  major	  Japanese	  ship	  owners	  and	  operators	  such	  as	  NYK,	  MOL	  and	  K	  Line	  considers	  the	  total	  cost	  including	  various	  maintenance	  cost	  and	  fuel	  cost	  in	  a	  long-­‐run	  because	  they	  tend	  to	  use	  one	  ship	  longer	  than	  others.	  And	  therefore,	  they	  could	  possibly	  accept	   increase	   in	   price	   for	   energy	   saving	   technologies	   if	   they	   could	   cover	   the	  additional	  cost	  by	  savings	  in	  running	  cost.	  	  In	  case	  of	  SSK,	  there	  are	  two	  kinds	  of	  realignments.	  The	  first	  one	  is	  realignment	  from	   middle-­‐end	   shipbuilder	   to	   high-­‐end	   shipbuilder	   by	   developing	   energy	  saving	   technologies,	   which	   is	   similar	   to	   JMU.	   And	   the	   second	   one	   is	  diversification	   into	   renewable	   energy	   products	   such	   as	   windmill	   business.	  Although	  SSK	  does	  not	  have	  ability	  to	  take	  the	  whole	  project,	  they	  are	  trying	  to	  join	   the	   project	   by	   realigning	   itself	   from	   being	   a	   project	   leader	   of	   the	   whole	  product	  producer	  to	  a	  vendor	  who	  partially	  joins	  the	  project.	  	  
6-­‐3	  Discussion	  and	  Recommendation	  
	  
Discussions	  Although	  retrenchments	  are	  taken	  by	  all	  firms	  as	  an	  initial	  action	  to	  stabilize	  the	  crisis,	  it	  was	  found	  that	  subsequent	  strategies	  (Reorganization	  and	  Realignment)	  are	   not	   fully	   established	   at	   this	   moment.	   Decline	   in	   actual	   performance	   has	  currently	  just	  started	  because	  of	  order	  backlogs	  until	  recent,	  which	  they	  served	  before	  the	  crisis	  with	  relatively	  good	  conditions.	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In	  the	  meantime,	  strategies	  taken	  by	  Japan	  and	  Europeans	  in	  the	  1970s	  oil	  crisis	  should	   be	   considered	  while	   providing	   recommendations	   to	   the	   three	   Japanese	  shipbuilders	  in	  current	  crisis	  mainly	  by	  two	  reasons.	  The	  first	  reason	  is	  because	  of	   the	   cumulativeness	  of	   sources.	   It	  means	   Japan’s	   knowledge	   and	   experiences	  cumulated	  during	   the	  oil	   crisis	   comprise	   firms’	   current	   sources.	  And	   therefore,	  study	   of	   the	   history	   is	   essential	   in	   order	   to	   understand	   the	   sources	   they	   have.	  And	  the	  second	  reason	  is	  to	  find	  helpful	  lessons	  from	  the	  Europeans	  that	  were	  in	  more	   advanced	   stage	   of	   development	   at	   the	   time.	   Practical	   lessons	   could	   be	  provided	  from	  the	  previous	  leader	  to	  whom	  following	  similar	  development	  paths.	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Figure	   6.1	   -­‐	   Concepts	   and	   strategies	   applied	   in	   the	   1970s	   and	  
recommendations	  for	  Japan	  in	  current	  crisis	  
	  
	  Source:	  The	  Author’s	  original	  developed	  for	  this	  research	  	  Strategies	  taken	  by	  Japan	  and	  Europe	  in	  the	  1970s	  are	  also	  shown	  in	  the	  figure.	  Japan	   stabilized	   its	   foundation	   by	   creating	   broader	   product	   and	   business	  portfolios.	   Japan	   also	   differentiated	   itself	   in	   the	   market	   by	   developing	   energy	  saving	  ships	  and	  these	  two	  movements	  are	  both	  analyzed	  as	  “Product”	  oriented.	  In	   case	   of	   Europeans,	   it	   tried	   to	   specialize	   in	   particular	   market,	   which	   was	   a	  “Product”	   oriented	  move.	   Europeans	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   diversified	   into	   other	  energy	  related	  businesses,	  which	  was	  a	  “Market”	  oriented	  move.	  	  
“Energy	  related	  moves”	  are	  the	  keyword	  for	  Japan	  in	  current	  crisis	  The	   keyword	   derived	   from	   the	   1970s	   analysis	   is	   “Energy	   related	  moves”	   that	  provides	  two	  strategic	  recommendations	  for	  Japan	  that	  are	  currently	  in	  crisis.	  At	  first,	  further	  differentiation	  by	  developing	  “Energy	  saving	  ships”	  that	  will	  not	  be	  easily	  imitated	  by	  competitors.	  And	  second,	  diversification	  into	  “Energy	  related”	  businesses	   including	   offshore	   oil	   drilling	   rigs,	   related	  workboats	   and	  windmill	  plants	   that	   could	   be	   achieved	   by	   reorganizing	   the	   sources,	   which	   shipyards	  already	  have.	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Differentiation	  by	  “Energy	  saving	  ships”	  Differentiation	  by	  further	  development	  of	  “Energy	  saving	  ships”	  is	  recommended	  to	  all	  of	   the	  three	   Japanese	  shipbuilders.	  Because	   Japanese	  well	  known	  “Kaizen	  skill”	  could	  help	  them	  keeping	  its	  motivation	  for	  endless	  improvement	  in	  energy	  saving	  technologies.	  Japan’s	  national	  character	  therefore	  matches	  perfectly	  with	  “Product	  oriented”	  strategies.	  	  Out	   of	   the	   three	   shipyards,	   development	   of	   energy	   saving	   ships	   is	   especially	  recommended	   for	   MHI	   and	   JMU	   having	   various	   group	   companies	   that	   could	  provide	   more	   “Synergy”	   than	   SSK	   with	   narrower	   business	   portfolios.	   Energy	  saving	   technologies	  of	   ships	  comprises	  of	  various	   factors	   including	  hull	  design,	  performance	   of	   engines,	   and	   various	   onboard	   machineries.	   And	   therefore,	  broader	   and	   closer	   relation	   with	   group	   companies	   producing	   onboard	  machineries	  could	  provide	  synergy	  effects	  in	  R&D.	  	  
Diversification	  into	  other	  “Energy	  related”	  businesses	  While	   considering	   diversification	   into	   various	   energy	   related	   businesses,	   it	   is	  important	  for	  shipyards	  to	  understand	  the	  character	  of	  businesses	  that	  are	  new	  for	  them.	  For	  example,	  offshore	  oil	  drilling	  rigs	  and	  related	  workboats	  are	  large	  in	  price,	  which	  amounts	  tens	  of	  billions	  in	  Japanese	  Yen.	  However,	  a	  large	  price	  does	  not	   simply	  mean	   that	   the	  products	  are	  profitable.	  High	   risks	  are	   involved	  while	  deciding	   the	  price	  upon	  contract	  because	   these	  products	  are	   tailor	  made	  for	   each	   projects	   and	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   keep	   the	   cost	   under	   shipyards’	   control.	  Offshore	  oil	  drilling	   rigs	   and	   related	  workboats	   are	   therefore	   recommended	   to	  big	  shipyards	  such	  as	  MHI	  and	   JMU	  having	  broader	  business	  portfolios	   for	  risk	  hedge,	   good	   financial	   condition,	   tolerance	   to	   accept	   failure	   and	   losses	   in	   some	  projects.	  	  In	  case	  of	  offshore	  windmill	  plants,	   shipyards	  already	  possess	  skill	   to	   fabricate	  pillars	  and	  floats	  that	  comprises	  the	  product.	  Its	  location	  and	  access	  to	  the	  ocean,	  which	   is	   suitable	   for	   sea	   transport	   of	   large	   products	   is	   also	   an	   advantage.	  However,	  shipyards	  cannot	  take	  the	  initiative	  of	  the	  projects	  because	  they	  do	  not	  have	  skills	   to	  manage	  the	  whole	  project	  by	  themselves.	   It	   is	   therefore	  analyzed	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that	  windmill	  products	  are	  associated	  with	  relatively	  low-­‐risk	  with	  low	  return.	  It	  could	  be	  recommended	  to	  all	  of	  the	  three	  shipyards	  but	  SSK	  having	  its	  shipyard	  in	   Kyushu	   area	  may	   have	   geographical	   advantage.	   Since	   Kyushu	   area	   is	   rarely	  attacked	  by	  Earthquakes	  and	  Tsunamis,	  it	  is	  currently	  focused	  as	  a	  place	  not	  only	  to	   relocate	   workshops	   from	   dangerous	   areas	   but	   also	   as	   a	   place	   to	   build	  renewable	  energy	  related	  plants	  since	  the	  disaster	  in	  2011.	  	  
Lessons	  from	  Europeans	  One	   of	   the	  most	   important	   lessons	   from	   the	   Europeans	   in	   the	   oil	   crisis	   is	   the	  “Market	   oriented”	   move	   taken	   by	   diversification	   into	   other	   energy	   related	  businesses.	   Although	   Japan	   and	   Europe	   both	   considered	   its	   advanced	  technologies	  as	  its	  core	  competence,	  Japan	  utilized	  it	  only	  for	  “Product	  oriented”	  moves	   while	   Europeans	   utilized	   it	   for	   both	   “Product”	   and	   “Market”	   oriented	  moves.	  An	  important	  lesson	  here	  is	  therefore	  the	  key	  technologies	  of	  shipyards	  could	   be	   utilized	   for	   various	   non-­‐marine	   products	   other	   than	   shipbuilding	   by	  reorganizing	  key	   technologies	  by	  different	   combinations.	   Change	   in	   focus	   from	  “Product	   oriented”	   focus	   to	   “Market	   oriented”	   focus	   could	   provide	   various	  opportunities	  for	  shipyards	  to	  diversify	  into	  other	  non-­‐marine	  products.	  	  Figure	   6.2	   shows	   the	   process	   of	   how	   shipyards	   utilize	   its	   key	   technologies	   for	  “Product	   oriented”	   moves	   and	   “Market”	   oriented”	   moves.	   It	   shows	   that	  reorganization	   of	   the	   key	   technologies	   by	   various	   combinations	   could	   allow	  shipyards	   to	   diversify	   not	   only	   into	   energy	   related	   businesses	   but	   also	   into	  various	  other	  businesses.	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Figure	  6.2	  –	  Combination	  of	  the	  Key	  technologies	  and	  two	  different	  Moves	  
Source:	  The	  Author’s	  original 	  An	   important	   lesson	   from	   the	   Europeans	   was	   that	   the	   combination	   of	   two	  different	   moves	   (Products	   &	   Markets)	   provided	   them	   with	   competitive	  advantages	  that	  are	  not	  easily	  taken	  away	  by	  competitors.	  	  They	  created	  a	  stable	  business	   foundation,	  which	   is	   not	   easily	   affected	  by	   cyclical	   fluctuations	   of	   the	  world	   shipbuilding	   industry.	   The	   challenge	   for	   Japanese	   shipbuilders	   to	  turnaround	   from	   the	   current	   crisis	   is	   therefore	   to	   create	   its	   own	   competitive	  advantage	   by	   utilizing	   its	   key	   technologies	   by	   different	   combinations.	   In	   other	  words,	   it	   is	   to	   create	   a	   strong	   market	   position	   in	   particular	   segments,	   which	  could	  not	  be	  easily	  copied	  by	  competitors.	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Chapter	  7	  	  	  Summary	  and	  Conclusion	  	  The	  world	   shipbuilding	   industry	   currently	   entered	   its	   largest	   recession	   period	  after	   the	   economic	   crisis	   lead	   by	   the	   failure	   of	   Lehman	  Brothers	   in	   2008.	   In	   a	  recession	  period,	  shipbuilders	   in	  developing	  countries	  expand	   its	  market	  share	  by	   taking	   previous	   leader’s	   share,	   which	   is	   a	   nature	   of	   shipbuilding.	   	   And	   it	  eventually	   causes	   cyclical	   change	   of	   leaders	   as	   it	   occurred	   periodically	   in	   the	  history.	  	  	  This	   is	   why	   shipbuilding	   is	   still	   highly	   labor-­‐intensive	   industry	   relying	   on	  human’s	   work.	   Although	   there	   had	   been	   various	   technological	   innovations	  appeared	   during	   its	   development,	   there	   had	   been	   no	   innovative	   technologies	  that	  could	  replace	  human’s	  work	  dramatically	  with	  automation.	  Shipbuilders	  in	  developed	   countries	   are	   therefore	   always	   challenged	   by	   developing	   countries	  having	  abundant	  low-­‐wage	  workers.	  	  However,	   evidence	   of	   various	   matured	   industries	   shows	   numbers	   of	   leaders	  achieving	   turnaround	   after	   a	   serious	   decline	   by	   adopting	   themselves	   to	  environmental	   change.	  What	  played	  an	   important	   role	   in	   turnaround	  cases	  are	  its	  “ability	  to	  respond	  to	  environmental	  change”.	  	  	  	  The	   goal	   for	   this	   research	   was	   to	   create	   an	   applicable	   turnaround	   model	   for	  Japanese	   shipbuilding	   industry	   that	   enables	   them	   to	   recover	   from	   the	   current	  crisis.	   What	   is	   important	   for	   managers	   working	   in	   a	   matured	   industry	   is	   to	  manage	   the	   process	   of	   turnaround.	   In	   order	   to	   achieve	   higher	   possibility	   of	  successful	   results,	   managers	   should	   manage	   the	   process	   theoretically	   but	   not	  accidentally.	  	  	  The	  3R-­‐ACAP	  model	   created	   through	   the	   study	   comprises	   of	   three	   turnaround	  strategies	   (Retrenchment,	   Reorganization	   and	   Realignment)	   and	   absorptive	  capacity	  (ACAP).	  ACAP	  works	  as	  firm’s	  ability	  to	  find	  useful	  information	  from	  its	  sources	   and	   to	   utilize	   it	   while	   creating	   turnaround	   strategies.	   Necessity	   of	  integrating	  the	  concept	  of	  ACAP	  into	  the	  3R	  turnaround	  model	  is	  to	  complement	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the	  missing	  function	  of	  the	  3R	  model.	  Although	  the	  “Ability	  to	  respond	  to	  change”	  was	   recognized	   by	   researchers	   as	   an	   important	   factor	   for	   turnarounds,	   the	  process	  of	  how	  firms	  recognize	  environmental	  change	  and	  how	  firms	  assimilate	  and	   utilize	   valuable	   information	   was	   not	   shown	   in	   any	   turnaround	   models.	  Therefore	  the	  concept	  of	  ACAP	  was	  integrated	  into	  the	  turnaround	  model.	  	  Feasibility	   of	   the	   3R-­‐ACAP	   model	   developed	   through	   literature	   surveys	   was	  examined	   in	   two	   steps.	   At	   first,	   it	   was	   examined	   by	   the	   three	   turnaround	  industries	   including	   the	   U.S.	   Copper	   Industry,	   British	   Steel	   Industry,	   and	   the	  Brazilian	  Aircraft	  Industry.	  As	  a	  result,	  some	  modifications	  toward	  an	  improved	  3R-­‐ACAP	   turnaround	   model	   was	   done.	   And	   second,	   it	   was	   examined	   by	   the	  Japanese	  and	  European	  shipbuilding	  industry	  in	  the	  1970s	  oil	  crisis.	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  was	  found	  that	  the	  3R-­‐ACAP	  turnaround	  model	  works	  properly	  to	  identify	  the	  eight	   factors	   (Internal	   Sources,	   External	   Sources,	   Triggers,	   Potential	   ACAP,	  Realized	   ACAP,	   Retrenchment,	   Reorganization,	   and	   Realignment)	   comprising	  turnaround	   strategies.	   And	   therefore,	   it	   came	   to	   the	   conclusion	   that	   3R-­‐ACAP	  model	  is	  an	  applicable	  turnaround	  model	  for	  Japanese	  Shipbuilding	  Industry.	  	  	  As	   a	   final	   step	   of	   the	   research,	   analysis	   of	  major	   Japanese	   shipyards	   including	  Mitsubishi	  Heavy	  Industry,	  Japan	  Marine	  United,	  and	  Sasebo	  Heavy	  Industry	  was	  done	  by	  the	  3R-­‐ACAP	  model	  to	  provide	  practical	  recommendations.	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  was	  found	  that	  although	  Retrenchment	  was	  taken	  by	  all	  firms	  as	  an	  initial	  action	  to	   stable	   the	   crisis,	   subsequent	   strategies	   were	   not	   yet	   fully	   organized	   at	   the	  moment.	  	  	  
Energy	  related	  moves	  are	  the	  keyword	  for	  Japan’s	  turnaround	  The	   keyword	   recommended	   for	   current	   Japan’s	   turnaround	   is	   “Energy	   related	  moves”	  which	  was	  derived	  from	  the	  study	  of	  1970s	  shipbuilding	  industry.	  Based	  on	   this	   keyword,	   Japan	   should	   go	   for	   further	   “Development	   in	   energy	   saving	  ships”	  and	  diversification	   into	  other	   “Energy	  related	  businesses”.	  An	   important	  lesson	  from	  the	  Europeans	  is	  to	  utilize	  its	  advanced	  key	  technologies	  not	  only	  for	  “Product	  oriented	  moves”	  but	   also	   for	   “Market	  oriented	  moves”.	   If	   Japan	   could	  combine	   “Market”	   oriented	   strategies	   in	   addition	   to	   “Product”	   oriented	  moves,	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Japan	  could	  create	  further	  competitive	  advantages	  that	  are	  not	  easily	  taken	  away	  by	  competitors.	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